VanHelsing is a financially motivated ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operation first promoted on the RAMP cybercrime forum in March 2025. Also styled Van Helsing or van_helsing, it advertises ransomware support for Windows, Linux, BSD, ARM, and ESXi environments and operates an affiliate model alongside a dedicated data-leak blog. The operation has publicly claimed victims in multiple sectors, including healthcare, government, legal services, technology, and commercial organizations; such leak-site claims do not independently establish that a compromise or encryption occurred. VanHelsing explicitly prohibits affiliates from targeting organizations in Russia and other Commonwealth of Independent States countries. In 2025, the operation released older source code for its affiliate panel, leak site, and Windows encryptor builder following an alleged attempt by a former developer to sell the code. The released material included Windows encryption and decryption components and indicated development work toward an MBR-locking capability. VanHelsing stated that it intended to return with an updated version branded VanHelsing 2.0.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
3 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
12 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Ransomware/hacking collective noted for prohibiting attacks on Russian-linked targets.
Ransomware-as-a-service group referenced as enforcing a no-CIS targeting rule for members and affiliates.
Associated with healthcare-sector dedicated leak-site postings.
Ransomware/extortion operations; in the dataset, claimed a major healthcare-related incident by records affected (Compumedics Limited, Australia) despite only one claimed healthcare attack.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.