Sinobi Group
Sinobi Group is a ransomware extortion actor identified in the provided content as operating under the name “Sinobi Group.” The group’s extortion note states it is financially motivated rather than politically motivated, offers file decryption and suppression of reputational harm in exchange for payment, sets a 7-day deadline to begin negotiations, directs victims to communicate via Tor-based chat portals with clearnet fallback domains, offers a free test decrypt, claims to have stolen files including income/insurance documents, and warns victims not to use third-party recovery tools or reboot systems. TRM Labs reporting cited in the content links Sinobi Group to a cluster of nearly 200 cryptocurrency addresses used to launder victim payments across multiple ransomware groups, specifically INC, Lynx, Sinobi Group, and info@ranshelp. In that investigation, TRM identified non-VPN IP access from Iran to the laundering cluster and found deposits from Sinobi-linked addresses to HashCr4cker, a credential decryption service, and Bearhost, a bulletproof hosting provider. Known aliases in the provided content: sinobi_group.
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Targeting
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Where they're from
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
- IR
Tradecraft
8 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
Recent activity
2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Ransomware group linked to laundering infrastructure accessed from Iran and to payments to cybercrime service providers including HashCr4cker and Bearhost.
Ransomware-style extortion operation: instructs victim to use Tor to access a negotiation chat, offers test decryption and a list of allegedly stolen files, threatens reputational damage via a leaks blog, and references possession of income/insurance documents (implying data theft and potential double-extortion).
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Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
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