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🇰🇵 KP2 malware families

Team 8

Also known asTeam 8

Team 8 is a North Korea-linked threat actor associated with the Contagious Interview campaign. According to the provided content, the group is spreading the StoatWaffle malware family through malicious Microsoft Visual Studio Code projects, using blockchain-themed repositories as lures. The campaign abuses VS Code's tasks.json auto-run behavior so that malicious code executes when a victim opens and trusts a repository. The infection chain is multi-stage: an initial task downloads payloads from Vercel and runs them via cmd.exe, installs Node.js if needed, and fetches additional files for cross-platform execution. StoatWaffle is described as modular malware implemented in Node.js, including a loader that communicates with command-and-control infrastructure, a second downloader, an information-stealing module, and a remote access trojan module. The stealer collects browser credentials, designated browser extension data, installed software details, macOS Keychain data, and can access Windows data through WSL environments. The RAT module enables remote command execution and returns results to the operators. The content states that Team 8 previously relied mainly on OtterCookie in the Contagious Interview campaign before adopting StoatWaffle around December 2025. The only alias directly supported by the content is team_8.

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OPERATIONAL PROFILE

Targeting

Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Where they're from

Attributed origin per open-source reporting.

  • KP
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

24 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.

10 of 15 tactics27 techniques×N= number of intelligence reports citing this technique
MITRE ATT&CK
TA0001
Initial Access
1 technique
T1195
Supply Chain Compromise
T1195.001
Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools
TA0002
Execution
2 techniques
T1059×3
Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.003×4
Windows Command Shell
T1059.004
Unix Shell
T1059.007×4
JavaScript
T1204×3
User Execution
T1204.002
Malicious File
TA0003
Persistence
1 technique
T1546
Event Triggered Execution
TA0004
Privilege Escalation
1 technique
T1546
Event Triggered Execution
TA0005
Stealth
1 technique
T1497
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
TA0006
Credential Access
3 techniques
T1539×2
Steal Web Session Cookie
T1555×3
Credentials from Password Stores
T1555.001
Keychain
T1555.003
Credentials from Web Browsers
T1649
Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates
TA0007
Discovery
4 techniques
T1082×3
System Information Discovery
T1083
File and Directory Discovery
T1497
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
T1518
Software Discovery
TA0009
Collection
1 technique
T1005×2
Data from Local System
TA0011
Command and Control
4 techniques
T1008
Fallback Channels
T1071
Application Layer Protocol
T1071.001×2
Web Protocols
T1105×4
Ingress Tool Transfer
T1219×2
Remote Access Tools
TA0010
Exfiltration
1 technique
T1041×3
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
IOCS

Observables

5 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.

IOC values are gated. View more in Mallory for domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: sector and geo overlap with your footprint, the IOCs they’re burning right now, detection coverage, and what to do next.
Target overlap

Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.

Tradecraft mapping24

Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.

Malware arsenal2

Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.

Exploited CVEs

CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Observables5

Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.