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4 malware familiesExploits CVEs in the wild

WaterHydra

Also known aswaterhydra

WaterHydra, also referred to in the provided content as DarkCasino and linked to Evilnum lineage, is described as a financially motivated threat group. The content attributes a 2026 GitHub-based operation run under the handle "evilgrou-tech" to the WaterHydra/DarkCasino APT group with high confidence, and states the group was behind exploitation of CVE-2024-21412 (Windows SmartScreen zero-day) and CVE-2023-38831 (WinRAR zero-day). The reporting ties together Evilnum, DarkCasino, WaterHydra, and the 2026 activity through a shared VB6 developer workspace path, C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\vaeeva\shellrundll.tlb, found in a 2022 Evilnum-linked DLL and a 2024 WaterHydra payload. The content states DarkMe RAT is the signature malware of the WaterHydra/DarkCasino group. Based on the provided reporting, WaterHydra targeted forex traders and financial trading platforms, with additional 2026 targeting noted against forex traders in Italy and cryptocurrency users associated with "Pumpfun." Tooling used in the attributed operation included DarkMe RAT written in VB6 and QuasarRAT v1.4.1.0 in .NET; a QuasarRAT "Sentinel" variant and a Quakbot LNK sample were also associated with the same infrastructure in the 2026 reporting. DarkMe samples shared consistent builder characteristics across 2023-2026, including a common VB6 imphash, and the report states the actor continued using an older DarkMe builder compiled in May 2022. The content also notes that WaterHydra removed some attribution artifacts between 2022 and 2024, including Italian variable names and the "DarkMe" mutex string, but left the embedded type library path. The described tradecraft included forex-themed lures; PowerShell and script-based loaders; AMSI bypasses; AES-encrypted payload staging from GitHub repositories; fileless .NET assembly loading; regsvr32 COM scriptlets; mshta execution; and persistence via registry Run/RunOnce keys, startup shortcuts, and HTA files. DarkMe communications used custom TCP over a SOCKET_WINDOW class, and QuasarRAT communications used TLS 1.2 to 91.124.98.29:2626 in the 2026 operation. The content further states that the 2026 operator "evilgrou-tech" was likely a lower-tier WaterHydra operator or affiliate using inherited tooling and an older, less sanitized DarkMe builder. Known names and linked aliases/sub-groups directly mentioned in the content are WaterHydra, DarkCasino, and Evilnum lineage; the 2026 operator handle associated with the group is "evilgrou-tech."

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OPERATIONAL PROFILE

Targeting

Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Financial Services

Where they target

Geographies tied to known operations.

  • 🇮🇹 Italy
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

28 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.

12 of 15 tactics50 techniques×N= number of intelligence reports citing this technique
MITRE ATT&CK
TA0042
Resource Development
2 techniques
T1583
Acquire Infrastructure
T1583.003
Virtual Private Server
T1588
Obtain Capabilities
T1588.004
Digital Certificates
TA0001
Initial Access
1 technique
T1566
Phishing
T1566.002
Spearphishing Link
TA0002
Execution
4 techniques
T1053
Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.005
Scheduled Task
T1059
Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.001×2
PowerShell
T1059.005
Visual Basic
T1059.007
JavaScript
T1203
Exploitation for Client Execution
T1204
User Execution
T1204.002
Malicious File
TA0003
Persistence
3 techniques
T1053
Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.005
Scheduled Task
T1112
Modify Registry
T1547
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
T1547.001
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
TA0004
Privilege Escalation
2 techniques
T1053
Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.005
Scheduled Task
T1547
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
T1547.001
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
TA0005
Stealth
4 techniques
T1027
Obfuscated Files or Information
T1036
Masquerading
T1036.001
Invalid Code Signature
T1140
Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
T1218
System Binary Proxy Execution
T1218.005
Mshta
T1218.011
Rundll32
TA0112
Defense Impairment
2 techniques
T1112
Modify Registry
T1553
Subvert Trust Controls
T1553.005×2
Mark-of-the-Web Bypass
TA0006
Credential Access
2 techniques
T1056
Input Capture
T1056.001×2
Keylogging
T1555
Credentials from Password Stores
T1555.003
Credentials from Web Browsers
TA0008
Lateral Movement
1 technique
T1021
Remote Services
T1021.005
VNC
TA0009
Collection
3 techniques
T1056
Input Capture
T1056.001×2
Keylogging
T1113
Screen Capture
T1560
Archive Collected Data
TA0011
Command and Control
3 techniques
T1105
Ingress Tool Transfer
T1219
Remote Access Tools
T1573
Encrypted Channel
T1573.001
Symmetric Cryptography
T1573.002
Asymmetric Cryptography
TA0010
Exfiltration
1 technique
T1567
Exfiltration Over Web Service
ARSENAL

Associated malware families

4 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.

IOCS

Observables

45 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.

IOC values are gated. View more in Mallory for domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.

What this page doesn’t show

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Target overlap

Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.

Tradecraft mapping28

Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.

Malware arsenal4

Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.

Exploited CVEs2

CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Observables45

Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.