NoviSpy
NoviSpy is a previously undocumented Android spyware family that Amnesty International reported in December 2024 and attributed with high confidence to Serbian authorities, specifically Serbian police and the Security Information Agency (BIA). It was reportedly deployed against activists, journalists, protestors, and other Serbian civil society members. Amnesty assessed that Serbian authorities used Cellebrite phone-unlocking/extraction tools to gain access to confiscated Android devices during arrests, detentions, interrogations, and informational interviews, and then installed NoviSpy on the unlocked phones. Amnesty stated these cases may be the first forensically documented spyware infections enabled by the use of Cellebrite tools, although Cellebrite said its products cannot install malware directly and that a third party would have to perform the installation.
The malware is described as less capable than Pegasus but able to capture personal data from infected phones and remotely activate the device microphone and camera. Amnesty reported forensic findings on the phones of journalist Slaviša Milanov and youth activist Nikola Ristić, and said analysis of about two dozen Serbian civil society devices identified additional infections. Amnesty assessed that some arrests or detentions may have been orchestrated specifically to obtain covert access to targets’ devices for extraction or infection.
Attribution details cited in the content include Serbian-language comments and strings in the code, communications with servers in Serbia, and command-and-control design involving IP address 195.178.51.251. Amnesty linked this infrastructure to the BIA through operational security mistakes and noted that the 195.178.51.xxx range remained associated with the agency, with the BIA public website recently hosted in that range. Amnesty also reported that NoviSpy code appeared to contain incrementing victim user IDs, suggesting broader operational use, and that a 2018-dated sample was found on VirusTotal, indicating the spyware had likely existed for several years.
The campaign was also linked to exploitation of Android/Qualcomm vulnerabilities. The content states that Serbian authorities used CVE-2024-43047, a Qualcomm/Android zero-day, in NoviSpy spyware attacks to unlock and infect Android devices, and Amnesty also identified a Qualcomm zero-day used against a Serbian activist’s device, likely in conjunction with Cellebrite. High-confidence indicators directly mentioned in the content include the malware name NoviSpy and the IP address 195.178.51.251 associated with its communications.
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Vulnerabilities exploited
1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
Last November, the company addressed a second Android zero-day (CVE-2024-43047) used by the Serbian government in NoviSpy spyware attacks, which was first tagged as exploited by Google Project Zero in October.
Groups observed using it
4 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Amnesty’s Security Lab, analyzed Milanov’s phone and indeed found that it had been unlocked using Cellebrite and had installed an Android spyware that Amnesty calls NoviSpy, from the Serbian word for “new.”
Amnesty’s Security Lab, analyzed Milanov’s phone and indeed found that it had been unlocked using Cellebrite and had installed an Android spyware that Amnesty calls NoviSpy, from the Serbian word for “new.”
Last November, the company addressed a second Android zero-day (CVE-2024-43047) used by the Serbian government in NoviSpy spyware attacks...
Last November, the company addressed a second Android zero-day (CVE-2024-43047) used by the Serbian government in NoviSpy spyware attacks...
Techniques & procedures
5 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Privilege Escalation
1 technique
Privilege Escalation
Collection
3 techniques
Collection
The tool, which targets Android devices, reportedly requires physical access to a device for installation and collects extensive data, including SMS and third-party chat messages, screen and audio recording, call logs, device contacts, location data, and network activity.
IOCs tracked for this family
1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
Recent activity
7 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Spyware installed on detainees’ devices during interrogations using forensic extraction tools.
Android spyware that captures data and remotely activates the device microphone and camera.
Spyware used after device unlocking to capture sensitive data and remotely activate microphone/camera.
Spyware used in attacks attributed to Serbian government authorities to unlock/access confiscated Android devices, leveraging Android zero-day vulnerabilities.
The version that knows your environment.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.