CoinTicker
CoinTicker is a macOS malware family described as a cryptocurrency ticker that also exhibits trojan/backdoor behavior. Reported capabilities include downloading secondary payloads with curl, decoding an initially downloaded hidden encoded file using OpenSSL, establishing persistence via user LaunchAgents, and executing a bash script to create a reverse shell. The malware uses hidden files and directories to evade detection, including /private/tmp/.info.enc, /private/tmp/.info.py, /private/tmp/.server.sh, ~/Library/LaunchAgents/.espl.plist, and ~/Library/Containers/.[random string]/[random string]. It creates LaunchAgent persistence entries named .espl.plist and com.apple.[random string].plist. Supporting content also notes that CoinTicker, along with Shlayer and Bundlore, used curl to fetch secondary payloads in a way that bypassed Gatekeeper because curl does not set the com.apple.quarantine attribute. High-confidence indicators and artifacts mentioned in the content are the hidden files and LaunchAgent names above, as well as the use of reverse-shell behavior on infected macOS systems.
Hunt this family in your stack
Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
Techniques & procedures
10 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Execution
4 techniques
Execution
Persistence
1 technique
Persistence
Privilege Escalation
1 technique
Privilege Escalation
Stealth
3 techniques
Stealth
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using obfuscated code, encrypted strings, Base64/XOR/RC4/AES encoding, VMProtect/ConfuserEx/SmartAssembly, stack strings, control-flow flattening, opaque predicates, and hidden payloads to evade analysis and detection.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors decoding, decrypting, deobfuscating, or unpacking payloads, strings, configuration data, commands, and C2 responses prior to execution or use.
Agent Tesla has created hidden folders. AppleJeus has added a leading . to plist filenames, unlisting them from the Finder app and default Terminal directory listings. APT28 has saved files with hidden file attributes. FIN13 has created hidden files and folders within a compromised Linux system /tmp directory and also used attrib.exe to hide gathered local host information.
Defense Impairment
1 technique
Defense Impairment
Recent activity
6 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
macOS malware family referenced as leveraging curl-based secondary payload delivery to evade Gatekeeper quarantine checks.
A macOS application that installs backdoors under the guise of a cryptocurrency ticker.
macOS malware that establishes persistence through user launch agents; associated in the content with cryptocurrency mining software persistence.
Downloads multiple hidden files on macOS to evade detection and maintain persistence.
The version that knows your environment.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.