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MalwareUsed by 1 actor

DustySky

Also known asNeD Worm

DustySky, also called “NeD Worm” by its developer, is a multi-stage Windows malware family reported in use since May 2015. It has been used by the Molerats threat group. Documented capabilities include host reconnaissance and collection, such as using Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to extract operating system information and determine whether antivirus is active, checking for the existence of antivirus, listing installed software, and detecting connected USB devices. DustySky also contains a keylogger and captures PNG screenshots of the main screen. For collection and exfiltration, it creates folders in temporary directories to stage collected files, can compress staged data with RAR, and has exfiltrated data to its command-and-control server. It can delete files it creates from the infected system after use. High-confidence behaviors directly mentioned in the source include temporary-directory staging, RAR archiving prior to exfiltration, screenshot capture, keylogging, USB device detection, installed-software enumeration, antivirus checks, WMI-based system discovery, exfiltration to C2, and cleanup via file deletion.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Molerats

DustySky (called “NeD Worm” by its developer) is a multi-stage malware in use since May 2015.

via clearsky blogclearskysec.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

28 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

6 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

In one case, the attackers used stolen email credentials and logged in from 96.44.156.201, potentially their proxy or VPN endpoint.

T1091Replication Through Removable MediaEvidence1

DustySky Core is a Trojan backdoor... Searching for removable media and network drives, and duplicating itself into them.

T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

IP address 45.32.13.169 and all the domains that are pointing to it host a webpage which is a copy of a legitimate and unrelated software website - iMazing... the version on the fake website is bundled with DustySky malware.

T1566PhishingEvidence1

If the target is using Windows, DuskySky is served. If the operating system is different than Windows, the target is served a Google, Microsoft, or Yahoo phishing page.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

The attackers would usually send a malicious email message that either links to an archive file (RAR or ZIP compressed) or has one attached to it.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

The attackers would usually send a malicious email message that either links to an archive file (RAR or ZIP compressed) or has one attached to it.

Execution

2 techniques
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationEvidence2
TacticExecution

The dropper uses Windows Management Instrumentation to extract information about the operating system and whether an antivirus is active.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1
TacticExecution

If the victim extracts the archive and clicks the .exe file, the lure document or video are presented while the computer is being infected with DustySky. | In recent samples the group used Microsoft Word files embed with a malicious macro, which would infect the victim if enabled. Note, that these infection methods rely on social engineering - convincing the victim to open the file (and enabling content if it is disabled) - and not on software vulnerabilities.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

In one case, the attackers used stolen email credentials and logged in from 96.44.156.201, potentially their proxy or VPN endpoint.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence4

A registry entry is created for persistency after computer restart.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

In one case, the attackers used stolen email credentials and logged in from 96.44.156.201, potentially their proxy or VPN endpoint.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence4

A registry entry is created for persistency after computer restart.

Stealth

4 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2
TacticStealth

The dropper uses the following function to obfuscate the name of functions and other parts of the malware (In later versions, SmartAssembly 6.9.0.114 .NET obfuscator was used).

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence5
TacticStealth

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware deleting files, tools, scripts, logs, droppers, staged data, and artifacts from compromised systems to cover tracks, remove evidence, or self-delete.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

In one case, the attackers used stolen email credentials and logged in from 96.44.156.201, potentially their proxy or VPN endpoint.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

For VM evasion the dropper checks whether there is a DLL that indicate that the malware is running in a virtual machine... If the dropper is indeed running in a virtual machine, it will open the lure document and stop its activity.

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

One of the components contained in DustySky core is a keylogger... When ordered by the command and control server, the keylogger is extracted and executed. Keylogging logs are saved to %TEMP%\temps.

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

They used BrowserPasswordDump, a public and free-to-use tool that recovers passwords saved in browsers.

Discovery

7 techniques
T1012Query RegistryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

The dropper uses Windows Management Instrumentation to extract information about the operating system and whether an antivirus is active.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence2
TacticDiscovery

They took screenshots and a list of active processes in the computer, and sent them to their command and control severs.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence3
TacticDiscovery

The DustySky dropper tries to evade running in a virtual machine. Once sure the computer is not a VM, it extracts, runs and adds persistency to DustySky Core. It extracts basic information about the operating system and checks for the existence of an Antivirus.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence3
TacticDiscovery

The malware would also scan the computer for files that contain certain keywords. The list of keywords, in base64 format, is retrieved from the command and control as a text file.

T1120Peripheral Device DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors identifying, monitoring, or enumerating connected peripheral devices such as USB mass storage, Bluetooth devices, printers, smart card readers, cameras, Apple devices, VGA/display devices, and removable drives.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

For VM evasion the dropper checks whether there is a DLL that indicate that the malware is running in a virtual machine... If the dropper is indeed running in a virtual machine, it will open the lure document and stop its activity.

T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence4
TacticDiscovery

DustySky Core is a Trojan backdoor and the main component of the malware. It has the following capabilities: Collecting information about the OS version, running processes and installed software.

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1091Replication Through Removable MediaEvidence1

DustySky Core is a Trojan backdoor... Searching for removable media and network drives, and duplicating itself into them.

Collection

4 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

One of the components contained in DustySky core is a keylogger... When ordered by the command and control server, the keylogger is extracted and executed. Keylogging logs are saved to %TEMP%\temps.

T1074Data StagedEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes adversaries and malware storing collected data, command output, credentials, archives, or files in local temporary folders, working directories, hidden directories, registry locations, recycle bins, or specific files prior to exfiltration.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence2

They took screenshots and a list of active processes in the computer, and sent them to their command and control severs.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

Multiple actors and tools are described as using 7-Zip/WinRAR/zip/tar/gzip/makecab/PowerShell Compress-Archive to compress (often password-protect/encrypt) collected data prior to exfiltration (e.g., “used 7zip to archive extracted data in preparation for exfiltration”, “created password-protected RAR archives prior to exfiltration”, “used built-in PowerShell capabilities (Compress-Archive cmdlet) to compress collected data”).

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

DustySky has two hardcoded domains of command and control servers. It starts by checking if the first one is alive by sending a GET request to TEST.php or index.php, expecting “OK” as response.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence3

Recently, command and control communication changed from HTTP to HTTPS.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

After infecting the computer, the attackers used both the capabilities of DustySky, and those of public hacking tools they had subsequently downloaded to the computer.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

DustySky Core is a Trojan backdoor and the main component of the malware... receives and executes commands.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence3

DustySky Core is a Trojan backdoor... It communicates with the command and control server, exfiltrates collected data, information and files, and receives and executes commands.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

227 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Network
119 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
84 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
24 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
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What this page doesn’t show

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IOC matching227

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Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping28

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.