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Mallory
Malware

PixRevolution

Tracked since Mar 12, 2026 · Updated 2 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK9Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
Type
Banking trojan
Capabilities
ExfiltrationDefense evasion
Delivery
Landing page
Platforms
Android

PixRevolution is an Android banking Trojan targeting Brazilian users of the Pix instant-payment system. It is distributed through counterfeit Google Play-style landing pages impersonating trusted brands and services, which induce victims to sideload a malicious APK and enable a fraudulent Accessibility service. After Accessibility permissions are granted, the malware can automate touch input, inspect on-screen text, capture device screens in near real time, and display deceptive WebView overlays.

The malware monitors displayed Portuguese-language banking and transfer terms and remains dormant until a victim initiates a Pix transaction. At that point, a human or AI-assisted operator can use the live device view to intervene during the payment flow, replace the intended recipient Pix key with an attacker-controlled recipient, and display a wait-message overlay to conceal the alteration. The transfer is then completed within the victim’s legitimate banking session, exploiting the immediate and generally irreversible nature of Pix payments. PixRevolution has been assessed as implicitly affecting users of most Brazilian financial institutions rather than relying on bank-specific user-interface automation.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

9 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

2 techniques
T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

when someone who stumbles on such a page attempts to download an app from the official Play Store, they instead download a malicious Android package kit (APK) file.

T1648Serverless ExecutionEvidence1

"Once installed, the apps urge users to enable accessibility services to realize their goals."; "TaxiSpy RAT... abuses Android's accessibility service..."; "The malware abuses accessibility permissions for persistent control"

Persistence

1 technique
T1546Event Triggered ExecutionEvidence1

That APK file registers a new Android accessibility option called 'Enable Revolution'... when they do that, the Trojan completely takes over the device. It has access to taps, swipes, all on-screen text, and all audio that reaches the microphone.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1546Event Triggered ExecutionEvidence1

That APK file registers a new Android accessibility option called 'Enable Revolution'... when they do that, the Trojan completely takes over the device. It has access to taps, swipes, all on-screen text, and all audio that reaches the microphone.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

It has access to taps, swipes, all on-screen text, and all audio that reaches the microphone. | the attacker puts up an HTML overlay telling them to please wait (Aguarde…) while the hijack takes place behind the scenes.

Collection

4 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

It has access to taps, swipes, all on-screen text, and all audio that reaches the microphone. | the attacker puts up an HTML overlay telling them to please wait (Aguarde…) while the hijack takes place behind the scenes.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

The Trojan also establishes a command-and-control (C2) server through port 9000 and gives the operator access to real-time screen capture with little delay.

T1123Audio CaptureEvidence1

It has access to taps, swipes, all on-screen text, and all audio that reaches the microphone.

T1185Browser Session HijackingEvidence1

When malware compromises the device, attackers can intercept authentication codes or manipulate legitimate banking sessions while appearing to be the real user.

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

The Trojan also establishes a command-and-control (C2) server through port 9000 and gives the operator access to real-time screen capture with little delay.

T1571Non-Standard PortEvidence1

"It also connects to an external server over TCP on port 9000 to send periodic heartbeat messages containing device information"

Activity feed

Recent activity

5 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

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Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping9Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.