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MalwareRansomwareUsed by 1 actor

BabaDeda Loader

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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BabaDeda

Cybersecurity researchers have flagged multiple ClickFix campaigns that deliver three malware loaders called BabaDeda Loader, Lorem Ipsum Loader, and Potemkin... Attacks involving BabaDeda Loader, observed in April 2026, have targeted education and financial organizations.

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

5 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

1 technique
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

The starting point of the attacks is a ClickFix social engineering attack that deceives users into running attacker-supplied PowerShell commands to deliver the loader...

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

The loader is designed to profile the host... before retrieving the main payload and injecting it into a trusted Windows process such as "svchost.exe."

Stealth

4 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

Earlier BabaDeda activity was known for concealing malicious payloads inside legitimate looking installer packages...

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

The loader is designed to profile the host... before retrieving the main payload and injecting it into a trusted Windows process such as "svchost.exe."

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

The loader is designed to profile the host, avoid running on Russian or Belarusian systems, and perform security product-related checks...

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

...used to drop information stealers and remote access trojans (RATs) by combining well-known techniques like hidden PowerShell, in-memory shellcode, DLL side-loading, and external payload storage.

Discovery

1 technique
T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

The loader is designed to profile the host, avoid running on Russian or Belarusian systems, and perform security product-related checks...

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping5

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.