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Malware

SmartRAT

Tracked since Jun 17, 2026 · Updated 11 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days1 mention · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK33Techniques
IOCs14Tracked
Type
RAT
Capabilities
Credential theftKeyloggingExfiltrationPersistencePrivilege escalationPost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissance
Delivery
PhishingLanding pageLureClickfix
Platforms
Windows

SmartRAT, also reported as Banana RAT, is a PowerShell-based remote access trojan targeting Windows systems, with a focus on Brazilian banking customers and financial theft. Identified by Zscaler ThreatLabz in a March 2026 campaign, it monitors activity involving Brazilian banks, payment platforms, and cryptocurrency services and alerts operators when targeted financial windows are opened.

SmartRAT provides remote screen viewing, keyboard and mouse control, arbitrary PowerShell execution, keylogging, clipboard manipulation, file browsing and exfiltration, and process and service enumeration. Operators can display bank-branded credential-harvesting overlays and block user input. Its QR-swap functionality detects on-screen QR codes and overlays attacker-supplied replacements to facilitate fraudulent transactions. The malware uses AES-encrypted command-and-control communications over raw TCP and dynamically compiles embedded C# components for input handling, screen capture, window monitoring, and overlay rendering.

Observed delivery uses bank-impersonation phishing pages and ClickFix social engineering. A fake CAPTCHA leads to a fullscreen counterfeit Windows crash or recovery screen that pressures victims into pasting and executing a malicious PowerShell command. A multistage PowerShell chain subsequently decrypts and executes the RAT. SmartRAT conceals its PowerShell windows and masquerades as Microsoft Edge update components. It establishes persistence through scheduled tasks or a registry startup entry and, when the victim approves UAC elevation, can install a Windows service running as SYSTEM. Its service implementation includes a watchdog to relaunch the malware. An associated web-based operator panel, branded MyGood PRO, used client-side-only authentication without server-side validation.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

33 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Reconnaissance

1 technique
T1598Phishing for InformationEvidence1

Cybercriminals are using these tools to rapidly scale convincing lures, ranging from simple credential harvesting to ClickFix campaigns delivering Remote Access Trojans (RATs).

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence2

The attackers set up a fake website mimicking a well-known Brazilian bank, complete with a convincing credit card application page and a fake security verification prompt.

T1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceEvidence2

The phishing page first shows a fake Cloudflare CAPTCHA, then triggers a fake Blue Screen of Death to panic victims into following instructions.

Execution

6 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence2

SmartRAT hides itself by disguising its files and scheduled tasks under Microsoft Edge update names, blending in with legitimate Windows processes.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

This threat features encrypted C2 communications, remote system control, credential theft via keylogging and banking overlays, and persistence through Windows services and scheduled tasks.

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence2

Execution T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter Use built-in interpreters (like PowerShell) to run malicious commands/scripts.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence4

This post analyzes a specific ClickFix campaign that mimics a Brazilian bank to deploy a newly discovered, PowerShell-based malware dubbed SmartRAT.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence2

Once a visitor interacts with the page, they are pressured into running a malicious PowerShell command, which quietly downloads and installs SmartRAT.

T1569.002Service ExecutionEvidence1

If UAC elevation is approved: SmartRAT compiles inline C# service code using csc.exe and installs a Windows service named MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore under %ProgramData%\Microsoft\Diagnosis\ETW. This service is configured to run with System privileges.

Persistence

4 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence2

SmartRAT hides itself by disguising its files and scheduled tasks under Microsoft Edge update names, blending in with legitimate Windows processes.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

This threat features encrypted C2 communications, remote system control, credential theft via keylogging and banking overlays, and persistence through Windows services and scheduled tasks.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence4

This threat features encrypted C2 communications, remote system control, credential theft via keylogging and banking overlays, and persistence through Windows services and scheduled tasks.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence3

Even if the user denies that request, SmartRAT persists through a hidden PowerShell process and a registry-based startup entry.

Privilege Escalation

7 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence2

SmartRAT hides itself by disguising its files and scheduled tasks under Microsoft Edge update names, blending in with legitimate Windows processes.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

This threat features encrypted C2 communications, remote system control, credential theft via keylogging and banking overlays, and persistence through Windows services and scheduled tasks.

T1134Access Token ManipulationEvidence1

SmartRAT also compiles another C# component that uses DuplicateTokenEx and CreateProcessAsUser to spawn a new PowerShell process using the current user’s session, even when the RAT is running as SYSTEM.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence4

This threat features encrypted C2 communications, remote system control, credential theft via keylogging and banking overlays, and persistence through Windows services and scheduled tasks.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence3

Even if the user denies that request, SmartRAT persists through a hidden PowerShell process and a registry-based startup entry.

T1548Abuse Elevation Control MechanismEvidence1

Prompts for User Account Control (UAC) elevation. If UAC elevation is approved... installs a Windows service... If UAC elevation is denied... launches a hidden PowerShell process that bypasses the UAC logic and beacons to the C2.

T1548.002Bypass User Account ControlEvidence1

It attempts to escalate privileges by prompting for UAC approval, and if granted, installs itself as a Windows service under SYSTEM-level access.

Stealth

6 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

SmartRAT decrypts two C2 server configurations. The first is decrypted using XOR with the key 2... The fallback C2 is an IP address that is decrypted using XOR with the key 233.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence3

SmartRAT hides itself by disguising its files and scheduled tasks under Microsoft Edge update names, blending in with legitimate Windows processes.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

0xA2 SystemCommand... uninstall: Complete self-removal; delete the service, scheduled tasks, registry keys, and all files, then exit.

T1134Access Token ManipulationEvidence1

SmartRAT also compiles another C# component that uses DuplicateTokenEx and CreateProcessAsUser to spawn a new PowerShell process using the current user’s session, even when the RAT is running as SYSTEM.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

The dropper fetches a second file, payload.php, containing an AES-encrypted PowerShell script that unpacks and executes SmartRAT.

T1564Hide ArtifactsEvidence1

The malware uses the port number 51888 for communication. SmartRAT also hides the running PowerShell window using user32.dll’s ShowWindow function.

Credential Access

3 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence3

The attacker can then take over the screen, inject keystrokes, block victim input, and steal whatever data is entered.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence4

This threat features encrypted C2 communications, remote system control, credential theft via keylogging and banking overlays...

T1056.003Web Portal CaptureEvidence1

This threat features encrypted C2 communications, remote system control, credential theft via keylogging and banking overlays...

Discovery

4 techniques
T1007System Service DiscoveryEvidence1

0xB3 ServiceList Return list of Windows services.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

0xB2 ProcessList Return list of running processes.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

GuestInfo (type 0xE6) Sends victim profile JSON (OS, username, host, privilege, session ID, install token, HMAC).

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

0x50 FileList Browse the victim's filesystem.

Collection

5 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence3

The attacker can then take over the screen, inject keystrokes, block victim input, and steal whatever data is entered.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence4

This threat features encrypted C2 communications, remote system control, credential theft via keylogging and banking overlays...

T1056.003Web Portal CaptureEvidence1

This threat features encrypted C2 communications, remote system control, credential theft via keylogging and banking overlays...

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence3

The malware can record keystrokes, capture screenshots, intercept QR codes, and display full-screen fake bank forms to steal credentials.

T1115Clipboard DataEvidence3

The infection begins when a victim pastes a PowerShell command into the Windows Run dialog, unaware it was silently planted in their clipboard by the malicious page.

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1001Data ObfuscationEvidence1

The encryption and decryption of C2 command traffic is handled by the following two functions... Uses AES-CBC to encrypt plaintext... The IV and ciphertext are each hex-encoded separately and returned as a colon-delimited string.

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence4

One striking discovery is that the attackers also used AI tools to build their command-and-control panel, a web interface used to manage infected machines.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

That command connects to a remote server at 64.95.13.238 and pulls down a file called st.txt, which acts as a hidden dropper. The dropper fetches a second file, payload.php, containing an AES-encrypted PowerShell script that unpacks and executes SmartRAT.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence2

SmartRAT is a PowerShell-based banking RAT used for remote access and financial data theft... supports encrypted C2 communications, remote control (screen/keyboard/mouse).

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

The information captured in the overlay form is then exfiltrated to the SmartRAT C2... 0x54 FileDownload Exfiltrate a file (up to 50MB).

Indicators of compromise

Observables

14 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

7 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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IOC matching14Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping33Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.