Insecure GitHub Actions pull_request_target workflow in Spotipy
CVE-2025-47928 affects Spotipy, a Python library for the Spotify Web API. The issue was introduced in commit 4f5759dbfb4506c7b6280572a4db1aabc1ac778d in .github/workflows/integration_tests.yml, where a GitHub Actions workflow used the pull_request_target trigger and then checked out attacker-controlled code from the forked pull request head (head.ref/head.sha). Because pull_request_target executes in the security context of the base repository, the workflow had access to repository secrets and a privileged GITHUB_TOKEN. The workflow then executed attacker-controlled code via pip install ., allowing arbitrary code execution during CI. According to the provided context, this enabled exfiltration of GITHUB_TOKEN, SPOTIPY_CLIENT_ID, and SPOTIPY_CLIENT_SECRET. The issue was fixed by reverting the vulnerable change in commit 9dfb7177b8d7bb98a5a6014f8e6436812a47576f.
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Impact, mitigation & remediation
What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.
Impact
What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
SPOTIPY_CLIENT_ID, SPOTIPY_CLIENT_SECRET, and especially a high-privilege GITHUB_TOKEN with content write permissions. With that token, an attacker could completely compromise or take over the repository, including modifying contents and potentially abusing CI/CD trust relationships.Mitigation
If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.
GITHUB_TOKEN permissions to the least required, and separate unprivileged PR testing from privileged post-validation workflows, for example by using pull_request for initial checks and workflow_run for trusted follow-on actions. Additional hardening includes preventing execution of attacker-controlled build/install steps in privileged jobs and monitoring CI runners for secret access, memory scraping, or outbound exfiltration behavior.Remediation
Patch, then assume compromise.
pull_request_target with checkout and execution of untrusted pull request code. In Spotipy, the vulnerable change was reverted in commit 9dfb7177b8d7bb98a5a6014f8e6436812a47576f, which fixed the issue. More generally, workflows handling code from forks should use pull_request for untrusted validation, avoid checking out head.ref or head.sha from forked PRs in privileged contexts, and avoid executing attacker-controlled package installation steps such as pip install . when secrets are available.Exploits
No public exploits tracked yet. Mallory keeps watching.
No public exploit code observed for this vulnerability.
Recent activity
2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
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