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Medium

Incorrect Tag Processing for Empty Messages in OpenSSL AES-GCM-SIV and AES-SIV

IdentifiersCVE-2026-45446CWE-347

CVE-2026-45446 is a flaw in OpenSSL's provider implementations of AES-SIV (RFC 5297) and AES-GCM-SIV (RFC 8452). During decryption, authentication of Additional Authenticated Data (AAD) is mishandled when the ciphertext is empty. Specifically, the expected authentication tag is only computed when the decryption path processes non-empty ciphertext data. If an application supplies AAD and then calls EVP_DecryptFinal_ex() without first invoking the ciphertext update path, as can occur when the received ciphertext length is zero, the tag is never recomputed and remains at its all-zero value. As a result, an attacker can cause authentication to succeed for forged empty-ciphertext messages. For AES-GCM-SIV, an attacker can send arbitrary AAD, empty ciphertext, and an all-zero tag and have it accepted under any unknown key in a single shot. For AES-SIV, exploitation requires reuse of the decryption context without resetting the key. AES-SIV has been present since OpenSSL 3.0 and AES-GCM-SIV since OpenSSL 3.2. OpenSSL's own TLS, CMS, PKCS7, HPKE, and QUIC protocol implementations do not use these modes, so exposure is limited to applications implementing their own protocols via the EVP interface.

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ANALYST BRIEF

Impact, mitigation & remediation

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Impact

What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.

Successful exploitation allows forgery of authenticated messages with empty ciphertext and attacker-controlled AAD. This breaks the integrity guarantees expected from AES-SIV and AES-GCM-SIV for that message class. In practice, a victim application may accept attacker-supplied metadata or protocol fields carried as AAD as authentic even though the attacker does not know the encryption key. The issue does not directly provide code execution or plaintext disclosure, but it can enable integrity bypass and acceptance of forged protocol messages. AES-GCM-SIV is more readily exploitable because the forgery works under any key in a single attempt; AES-SIV requires decryption-context reuse without key reset.

Mitigation

If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.

Until patched versions are deployed, avoid using the affected AES-SIV and AES-GCM-SIV EVP decryption paths for messages with zero-length ciphertext. Applications should reject empty-ciphertext messages where feasible, ensure decryption logic does not skip ciphertext update processing solely because the ciphertext length is zero, and avoid reusing AES-SIV decryption contexts without resetting the key. Exposure can also be reduced by avoiding custom protocols that rely on these modes through the EVP interface until fixes are installed.

Remediation

Patch, then assume compromise.

Upgrade OpenSSL to a fixed vendor release that corrects tag handling for empty-ciphertext decryption in AES-SIV and AES-GCM-SIV. Also review any application code or custom protocol logic using these AEAD modes through the EVP interface to ensure zero-length ciphertext cases are handled correctly and do not bypass the normal ciphertext update path before EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(). Apply vendor package updates where applicable, such as operating system security updates that incorporate the OpenSSL fixes.
PUBLIC EXPLOITS

Exploits

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VALID 0 / 0 TOTALView more in app

No public exploit code observed for this vulnerability.

EXPOSURE SURFACE

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VendorProductType
FreebsdFreebsdapplication
OpenSSL Software FoundationOpensslapplication

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