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Medium

Trust-Anchor Substitution in OpenSSL CMP rootCaKeyUpdate Handling

IdentifiersCVE-2026-42769CWE-295· Improper Certificate Validation

CVE-2026-42769 is a low-severity certificate validation flaw in OpenSSL's Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) handling of Root CA key rollover messages of type id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate. During processing via OSSL_CMP_get1_rootCaKeyUpdate(), OpenSSL is expected to validate the newWithOld certificate, which contains the new root CA certificate signed by the old root CA key and is critical for transferring trust from the old root CA to the new one. Due to a typo in the certificate chain building logic, the code adds the wrong certificate to the chain (newWithOld instead of oldRoot), making the signature verification effectively ineffectual. As a result, only limited properties such as issuer name and algorithm OIDs are checked by other code paths, rather than properly validating the trust transition. An attacker who already possesses CMP credentials sufficient to satisfy message protection checks at the Registration Authority (RA) level can craft an id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate message containing a self-signed arbitrary root certificate and cause affected CMP clients to accept it as a new trust anchor.

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ANALYST BRIEF

Impact, mitigation & remediation

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Impact

What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.

Successful exploitation allows an attacker with valid RA-level CMP credentials to substitute the trusted root CA certificate used by affected CMP clients. This effectively escalates authority from the Registration Authority level to root CA trust level, enabling trust-anchor replacement with an attacker-controlled root certificate. The practical consequence is compromise of the client trust model for CMP-managed PKI operations, potentially allowing issuance trust subversion, acceptance of attacker-controlled certification paths, and broader credential or identity trust compromise. The issue was assessed as low severity because exploitation requires pre-existing valid RA-level credentials. The OpenSSL FIPS modules are not affected because the vulnerable code is outside the FIPS module boundary.

Mitigation

If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.

No complete workaround is provided in the advisory content. Until patches are deployed, reduce exposure by tightly restricting and protecting RA-level CMP credentials, limiting which entities are authorized to send CMP root CA rollover messages, disabling or avoiding CMP rootCaKeyUpdate processing where operationally feasible, and monitoring for unexpected or suspicious id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate messages or root trust-anchor changes on CMP clients. Because exploitation depends on valid CMP message protection credentials, strong credential hygiene and access control for RA functions materially reduce risk.

Remediation

Patch, then assume compromise.

Upgrade OpenSSL to a fixed vendor release that corrects verification of the newWithOld certificate in OSSL_CMP_get1_rootCaKeyUpdate(). The provided content indicates fixes were included in OpenSSL 4.0.1, 3.6.3, 3.5.7, 3.4.6, and 3.0.21, with downstream vendors also shipping patched packages. Apply the appropriate vendor update for the affected OpenSSL branch and redeploy or restart dependent applications as required by the platform.
PUBLIC EXPLOITS

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VALID 0 / 0 TOTALView more in app

No public exploit code observed for this vulnerability.

EXPOSURE SURFACE

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VendorProductType
FreebsdFreebsdapplication
OpenSSL Software FoundationOpensslapplication

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