Weak PBKDF2 Defaults in Crypt::PBKDF2 for Perl
CVE-2026-9641 affects Crypt::PBKDF2 for Perl versions prior to 0.261630. The vulnerability is caused by insecure default PBKDF2 parameters used by the module for password hashing or key derivation: the default PRF/hash algorithm is HMAC-SHA1 and the default iteration count is only 1000. The advisory states these defaults are no longer appropriate for modern deployments, with HMAC-SHA1 suitable only for legacy compatibility and 1000 iterations providing insufficient computational cost. Current guidance cited in the supporting content recommends substantially higher iteration counts depending on the selected algorithm, approximately 220,000 to 1,400,000 iterations, and the fixed release changes the defaults to HMAC-SHA256 with 600,000 iterations.
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Recent activity
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
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