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Daixin Team is a financially motivated cybercrime and ransomware group active since at least 2022. The group is best known for ransomware and data-extortion operations against organizations in the United States, with a pronounced focus on the Healthcare and Public Health sector, while also being linked to intrusions affecting other industries such as aviation. Known aliases include Daixin, Daixin Group, and Daixin Team. Daixin commonly gains initial access through internet-exposed remote access infrastructure, particularly VPN services, by exploiting unpatched vulnerabilities or using previously compromised credentials. Public reporting also associates the group with phishing emails carrying malicious attachments to obtain credentials. After access, Daixin has been observed moving laterally through SSH and Remote Desktop Protocol, escalating privileges via credential dumping and pass-the-hash, and leveraging privileged accounts to access VMware vCenter and ESXi environments. In victim networks, the group has reset ESXi account passwords, connected to accessible hypervisors over SSH, and deployed ransomware that targets virtualized infrastructure. Third-party reporting has linked the ransomware to leaked Babuk Locker source code. In addition to encryption, Daixin conducts data theft to pressure victims into paying, including exfiltration of sensitive personal and health information. Reported exfiltration tooling includes utilities such as Rclone and tunneling services such as Ngrok. The group has threatened to publish stolen data when victims refuse payment, making its operations consistent with double-extortion ransomware. Reported victimology includes hospitals, ambulance services, and other healthcare entities, with impacts to systems supporting electronic health records, diagnostics, imaging, and internal services. Daixin has also been associated with a 2022 attack on AirAsia Group involving theft of passenger and employee data. Operational reporting further indicates overlap between Daixin investigations and infrastructure seen in broader ransomware ecosystems. In one airline-related case attributed to Daixin, plausible access paths included credential theft via information-stealing malware and attacks against a vulnerable public-facing SSH service. High-confidence reporting consistently characterizes Daixin as a cybercriminal rather than state-sponsored actor.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
21 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
2 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
16 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
8 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Referenced as another extortion group known for refusing low payment offers and leaking data to reinforce credibility in future negotiations.
Cited only as background context for prior investigations involving some of the same IP addresses.
Claimed responsibility for a ransomware attack against an airline and is assessed as likely using credential theft, spear-phishing, exploitation of public-facing services, and compromise of SSH services for initial access and follow-on intrusion activity.
Ransomware/extortion actor referenced as responsible for a 2022 attack on AirAsia Group resulting in theft of data for nearly 5 million passengers and employees.
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Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.