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GonnaCry is an open-source ransomware proof of concept created around 2017 and primarily associated with Linux systems. It was originally developed for educational purposes to demonstrate ransomware mechanics and file encryption, and later Linux variants were observed in the wild. It has also been listed among publicly available encryption tools possessed or used by DPRK-linked ransomware operators, although that does not by itself establish GonnaCry as uniquely attributable to a single threat actor.
GonnaCry’s core behavior is file discovery and encryption. It recursively traverses user-accessible directories, targets a broad hardcoded set of file types including documents, images, archives, databases, and virtual disk formats, encrypts selected files, renames them with a dedicated extension, and drops a ransom note. In the analyzed macOS-compiled sample, the malware also serialized per-file encryption metadata and wrote plaintext keying material to the victim’s Desktop, then overwrote and deleted original files. The sample used Blowfish in CBC mode via OpenSSL, but its cryptography was fundamentally flawed because key and IV generation relied on rand() without proper seeding and with restricted character entropy, making it a weak and likely experimental implementation.
The malware is best characterized as ransomware. High-confidence reporting indicates Linux is its primary platform. A Mach-O arm64 sample closely matching the Linux codebase showed signs of an incomplete or experimental macOS port, including retained Linux-specific path logic and dependency issues that hindered execution under normal macOS protections. That sample appeared to be a test or beginner-level proof of concept rather than evidence of a mature macOS ransomware campaign.
GonnaCry has been referenced in broader ransomware tracking as one of several newer families identified in 2020 and as a publicly available encryption tool accessible to threat actors. The strongest corroborated characterization remains that of a Linux-focused, educationally originated ransomware family with limited sophistication and at least some later malicious reuse.
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5 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
4 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Open-source ransomware proof-of-concept originally created for Linux and later observed in malicious Linux variants; the analyzed sample is a macOS Mach-O build that encrypts files, appends the .GNNCRY extension, drops a ransom note, stores keys/IVs in plaintext in enc_files.gc, and uses weak predictable Blowfish key generation.
Ransomware family targeting Linux systems.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.