DPRK cyber actors
DPRK cyber actors are described in a joint #StopRansomware advisory as Democratic People’s Republic of Korea state-sponsored ransomware operators. The content states they have conducted ongoing ransomware activity targeting Healthcare and Public Health sector organizations, including U.S. and South Korean healthcare entities, as well as other critical infrastructure. The advisory also notes DPRK cyber operations targeting the United States and South Korea governments, including Department of Defense Information Networks and Defense Industrial Base member networks. According to the content, these actors use ransomware operations to generate revenue, with some proceeds assessed to support DPRK national-level priorities and objectives. Reported ransomware associated with these actors includes Maui and H0lyGh0st. The content also states they have been observed using or possessing publicly available encryption tools including BitLocker, Deadbolt, ech0raix, GonnaCry, Hidden Tear, Jigsaw, LockBit 2.0, My Little Ransomware, NxRansomware, Ryuk, and YourRansom, and that they have at times portrayed themselves as other ransomware groups, including REvil. The described tradecraft includes acquiring infrastructure by generating domains, personas, and accounts; procuring infrastructure, IP addresses, and domains using cryptocurrency generated through illicit cybercrime such as ransomware and cryptocurrency theft; and obfuscating attribution through third-country identities, foreign intermediaries, VPNs, VPSs, and third-country IP addresses. For initial access, the content states they exploit known vulnerabilities including CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell), CVE-2021-20038 (SonicWall SMA100), and CVE-2022-24990 (TerraMaster TOS). They are also described as distributing Trojanized files for the X-Popup messenger used by small and medium hospitals in South Korea, including via the domains xpopup.pe[.]kr and xpopup[.]com. Post-compromise, the actors are described as using staged payloads and customized malware to conduct reconnaissance, transfer files, execute shell commands, collect victim information, and send that information to actor-controlled remote hosts. They then deploy ransomware, set ransom demands in bitcoin, and communicate with victims via Proton Mail accounts. Known aliases and subgroup names directly mentioned in the content: Maui and H0lyGh0st.
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Targeting
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Who they target
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
- Health Care Equipment & Services
Where they target
Geographies tied to known operations.
- 🇺🇸 United States
- 🇰🇷 South Korea
Where they're from
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
- KP
Tradecraft
8 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
Associated malware families
13 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
8 additional families tracked in Mallory.
Recent activity
1 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.
The version that knows your environment.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.