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MalwareRansomware

SHub Stealer v2.0

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Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

23 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

The entered password is validated locally using dscl . -authonly against the current username. If the password is incorrect, the dialog re-appears — up to 10 retry attempts.

Execution

5 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

Persistence: The stealer calls https://terafolt[.]com/api/bot/heartbeat to register the compromised host and poll for follow-up commands.

T1059.002AppleScriptEvidence1

Execution: Pipes the downloaded AppleScript directly to osascript, the macOS AppleScript interpreter, achieving fileless execution in the second stage.

T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence1

The loader is a 589-byte shell script compressed with gzip and encoded in Base64.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence2

“…leveraging the ClickFix initial access technique to social-engineer victims into installing infostealers.” / “how fake captcha can lead to a company-wide infection”

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

Electron-based wallet apps load their core logic from app.asar, so replacing it allows the attacker to inject persistent code that executes every time the wallet is opened.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

The entered password is validated locally using dscl . -authonly against the current username. If the password is incorrect, the dialog re-appears — up to 10 retry attempts.

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

A distinctive capability: for Exodus, Atomic Wallet, Ledger Live, and Trezor Suite, the stealer replaces the application's app.asar file with a trojanized version.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

The entered password is validated locally using dscl . -authonly against the current username. If the password is incorrect, the dialog re-appears — up to 10 retry attempts.

Stealth

4 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

The loader is a 589-byte shell script compressed with gzip and encoded in Base64.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

for Exodus, Atomic Wallet, Ledger Live, and Trezor Suite, the stealer replaces the application's app.asar file with a trojanized version. | The stealer displays a fake System Preferences dialog box prompting the user to enter their macOS password.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

The entered password is validated locally using dscl . -authonly against the current username. If the password is incorrect, the dialog re-appears — up to 10 retry attempts.

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

Electron-based wallet apps load their core logic from app.asar, so replacing it allows the attacker to inject persistent code that executes every time the wallet is opened.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

A distinctive capability: for Exodus, Atomic Wallet, Ledger Live, and Trezor Suite, the stealer replaces the application's app.asar file with a trojanized version.

Credential Access

7 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

The stealer displays a fake System Preferences dialog box prompting the user to enter their macOS password.

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

For each Chromium browser, the stealer extracts Login Data, Cookies, Web Data... Firefox profile directories are enumerated for ... cookies.sqlite

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

For each Chromium browser, the stealer extracts Login Data, Cookies, Web Data (autofill and credit cards), and Local State (for encryption key extraction). Firefox profile directories are enumerated for logins.json, cookies.sqlite, and key4.db.

T1555.001KeychainEvidence1

macOS Keychain Dumps keychain entries using harvested password

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence1

For each Chromium browser, the stealer extracts Login Data, Cookies, Web Data (autofill and credit cards), and Local State... Firefox profile directories are enumerated for logins.json, cookies.sqlite, and key4.db.

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

A distinctive capability: for Exodus, Atomic Wallet, Ledger Live, and Trezor Suite, the stealer replaces the application's app.asar file with a trojanized version.

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence1

The entered password is validated locally using dscl . -authonly against the current username. If the password is incorrect, the dialog re-appears — up to 10 retry attempts.

Discovery

1 technique
T1614System Location DiscoveryEvidence1

CIS Geofencing: Checks the active keyboard input source. If a Russian layout is detected, execution terminates immediately.

Collection

3 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

Beyond crypto, it harvests macOS Keychain data, iCloud credentials, Safari and Firefox data, Apple Notes, Telegram sessions, and shell history.

T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

The stealer displays a fake System Preferences dialog box prompting the user to enter their macOS password.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

All collected data is packaged and sent as a multipart POST request to https://terafolt[.]com/gate.

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

Gate URL https://terafolt[.]com/gate Heartbeat https://terafolt[.]com/api/bot/heartbeat

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

Gate URL https://terafolt[.]com/gate Heartbeat https://terafolt[.]com/api/bot/heartbeat

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

Payload Retrieval: Downloads the AppleScript payload from the same terafolt[.]com C2 server.

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

Exfiltration: All collected data is packaged and sent as a multipart POST request to https://terafolt[.]com/gate.

T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence1

All collected data is packaged and sent as a multipart POST request to https://terafolt[.]com/gate.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

7 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
1 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
4 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
2 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 months ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 months ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 months ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 months ago
uri●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 months ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 months ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching7

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping23

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.