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Malware

ClipXDaemon

Tracked since Mar 5, 2026 · Updated 4 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK13Techniques
IOCs4Tracked
Type
Clipper
Capabilities
Crypto theftPersistenceDefense evasion
Platforms
Linux

ClipXDaemon is a Linux cryptocurrency clipboard hijacker that targets users of X11-based desktop environments. It is designed for direct financial theft by monitoring clipboard contents at high frequency and replacing copied cryptocurrency wallet addresses with attacker-controlled alternatives before the victim pastes them into a transaction workflow. Reported targeting includes multiple wallet formats such as Bitcoin, Ethereum, Litecoin, Monero, Dogecoin, Tron, Ripple, and TON.

The malware operates without command-and-control infrastructure and has been characterized as autonomous and fully offline. Analyses reported no beaconing, remote tasking, DNS activity, HTTP traffic, or general socket communication. Instead of relying on external infrastructure, ClipXDaemon monetizes infections locally through clipboard manipulation alone.

Observed delivery involves a multi-stage infection chain built around a bincrypter-based loader. The initial stage decrypts and launches an intermediate dropper largely in memory, after which the dropper writes a randomized ELF payload into the user environment, launches it, and establishes persistence by modifying the user profile so the malware is re-executed during future logins. The final payload is a 64-bit Linux ELF linked against X11 libraries.

ClipXDaemon is tailored specifically for X11. It checks for Wayland and exits when Wayland is detected, reflecting Wayland’s stronger restrictions on global clipboard access. Under X11, the payload daemonizes, detaches from the terminal, and masquerades as a kernel worker-style process name to reduce suspicion. It then connects to the X server, polls clipboard selections roughly every 200 milliseconds, identifies cryptocurrency address patterns, and takes ownership of the clipboard selection to supply substituted wallet data at paste time.

The malware also employs basic defense-evasion measures. Reported samples used process masquerading and encrypted internal configuration data, including wallet-matching patterns and replacement values, to complicate static analysis. Public reporting noted structural similarities between the delivery chain used for ClipXDaemon and tooling previously seen with ShadowHS, but available information does not support attributing both to the same operator or campaign; the overlap is assessed as reuse of publicly available tooling rather than proof of common authorship.

ClipXDaemon represents a notable example of specialized Linux financial malware focused on cryptocurrency theft in desktop environments rather than broader remote access or botnet functionality.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

13 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

1 technique
T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence3

The initial loader runs via a shell wrapper generated with bincrypter, which decrypts and launches the embedded dropper.

Persistence

3 techniques
T1037Boot or Logon Initialization ScriptsEvidence1

ClipXDaemon operates locally without network communication... and persists by modifying the user’s ~/.profile file.

T1546.004Unix Shell Configuration ModificationEvidence1

"It then appends the payload’s execution to ~/.profile , creating login-triggered persistence"

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence2

The dropper adds execution of the ELF payload to ~/.profile, enabling persistence upon user login.

Privilege Escalation

4 techniques
T1037Boot or Logon Initialization ScriptsEvidence1

ClipXDaemon operates locally without network communication... and persists by modifying the user’s ~/.profile file.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

"executes the intermediate dropper directly through a /proc/self/fd file descriptor — never writing the decrypted stage to disk"

T1546.004Unix Shell Configuration ModificationEvidence1

"It then appends the payload’s execution to ~/.profile , creating login-triggered persistence"

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence2

The dropper adds execution of the ELF payload to ~/.profile, enabling persistence upon user login.

Stealth

6 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence3

The loader uses AES-256-CBC encryption and gzip compression to conceal payload contents. The ELF configuration is further encrypted with ChaCha20.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence5

The payload renames itself using prctl(PR_SET_NAME) to mimic kernel worker threads.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

"executes the intermediate dropper directly through a /proc/self/fd file descriptor — never writing the decrypted stage to disk"

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

"checks whether the Wayland display server is present and exits immediately if detected"

T1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesEvidence1

"writes it to a randomized filename under ~/.local/bin/"

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence2

The intermediate dropper executes directly from /proc/self/fd, avoiding on-disk script artifacts.

Discovery

2 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

The payload checks for the presence of Wayland (WAYLAND_DISPLAY) to determine whether execution is viable.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

"checks whether the Wayland display server is present and exits immediately if detected"

Collection

1 technique
T1115Clipboard DataEvidence5

The payload abuses X11 selection APIs to retrieve clipboard contents and monitor cryptocurrency wallet patterns.

Impact

1 technique
T1565Data ManipulationEvidence2

The malware modifies clipboard data in transit by replacing legitimate wallet addresses with attacker-controlled addresses.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

4 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

7 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching4Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping13Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.