ClipXDaemon
- Type
- Clipper
- Capabilities
- Crypto theftPersistenceDefense evasion
- Platforms
- Linux
ClipXDaemon is a Linux cryptocurrency clipboard hijacker that targets users of X11-based desktop environments. It is designed for direct financial theft by monitoring clipboard contents at high frequency and replacing copied cryptocurrency wallet addresses with attacker-controlled alternatives before the victim pastes them into a transaction workflow. Reported targeting includes multiple wallet formats such as Bitcoin, Ethereum, Litecoin, Monero, Dogecoin, Tron, Ripple, and TON.
The malware operates without command-and-control infrastructure and has been characterized as autonomous and fully offline. Analyses reported no beaconing, remote tasking, DNS activity, HTTP traffic, or general socket communication. Instead of relying on external infrastructure, ClipXDaemon monetizes infections locally through clipboard manipulation alone.
Observed delivery involves a multi-stage infection chain built around a bincrypter-based loader. The initial stage decrypts and launches an intermediate dropper largely in memory, after which the dropper writes a randomized ELF payload into the user environment, launches it, and establishes persistence by modifying the user profile so the malware is re-executed during future logins. The final payload is a 64-bit Linux ELF linked against X11 libraries.
ClipXDaemon is tailored specifically for X11. It checks for Wayland and exits when Wayland is detected, reflecting Wayland’s stronger restrictions on global clipboard access. Under X11, the payload daemonizes, detaches from the terminal, and masquerades as a kernel worker-style process name to reduce suspicion. It then connects to the X server, polls clipboard selections roughly every 200 milliseconds, identifies cryptocurrency address patterns, and takes ownership of the clipboard selection to supply substituted wallet data at paste time.
The malware also employs basic defense-evasion measures. Reported samples used process masquerading and encrypted internal configuration data, including wallet-matching patterns and replacement values, to complicate static analysis. Public reporting noted structural similarities between the delivery chain used for ClipXDaemon and tooling previously seen with ShadowHS, but available information does not support attributing both to the same operator or campaign; the overlap is assessed as reuse of publicly available tooling rather than proof of common authorship.
ClipXDaemon represents a notable example of specialized Linux financial malware focused on cryptocurrency theft in desktop environments rather than broader remote access or botnet functionality.
Techniques & procedures
13 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Execution
1 technique
Execution
The initial loader runs via a shell wrapper generated with bincrypter, which decrypts and launches the embedded dropper.
Persistence
3 techniques
Persistence
ClipXDaemon operates locally without network communication... and persists by modifying the user’s ~/.profile file.
"It then appends the payload’s execution to ~/.profile , creating login-triggered persistence"
The dropper adds execution of the ELF payload to ~/.profile, enabling persistence upon user login.
Privilege Escalation
4 techniques
Privilege Escalation
ClipXDaemon operates locally without network communication... and persists by modifying the user’s ~/.profile file.
"executes the intermediate dropper directly through a /proc/self/fd file descriptor — never writing the decrypted stage to disk"
"It then appends the payload’s execution to ~/.profile , creating login-triggered persistence"
The dropper adds execution of the ELF payload to ~/.profile, enabling persistence upon user login.
Stealth
6 techniques
Stealth
The loader uses AES-256-CBC encryption and gzip compression to conceal payload contents. The ELF configuration is further encrypted with ChaCha20.
The payload renames itself using prctl(PR_SET_NAME) to mimic kernel worker threads.
"executes the intermediate dropper directly through a /proc/self/fd file descriptor — never writing the decrypted stage to disk"
"checks whether the Wayland display server is present and exits immediately if detected"
"writes it to a randomized filename under ~/.local/bin/"
The intermediate dropper executes directly from /proc/self/fd, avoiding on-disk script artifacts.
Discovery
2 techniques
Discovery
The payload checks for the presence of Wayland (WAYLAND_DISPLAY) to determine whether execution is viable.
"checks whether the Wayland display server is present and exits immediately if detected"
Collection
1 technique
Collection
The payload abuses X11 selection APIs to retrieve clipboard contents and monitor cryptocurrency wallet patterns.
Impact
1 technique
Impact
The malware modifies clipboard data in transit by replacing legitimate wallet addresses with attacker-controlled addresses.
Observables
4 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
7 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.