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Mallory
Malware

MYRA

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For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

15 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

3 techniques
T1053.003CronEvidence1

persistStealthCron() writes a wrapper script to /usr/local/lib/.cache-update.sh and installs it as a cron entry... const cronLine = `*/${ interval } * * * * ${ p . wrapperPath } >/dev/null 2>&1` ;

T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence1

shell-oneshot shell Execute arbitrary commands via child_process.spawn with shell: true ... shell-pty shell_start , shell_input , shell_stop , shell_resize Full interactive PTY shell via node-pty

T1574.006Dynamic Linker HijackingEvidence1

libcache.so: LD_PRELOAD file hiding ... Once deployed to /etc/ld.so.preload , this library loads into every new process on the system, hiding the RAT’s persistence artifacts from ls , find , stat , and any tool that uses libc directory enumeration.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1037.004RC ScriptsEvidence1

persistStealthProfile() writes to /etc/profile.d/.sh.local , which executes the wrapper script in the background on every user login: const profileContent = `[ -x "${ p . wrapperPath }" ] && "${ p . wrapperPath }" >/dev/null 2>&1 & \n ` ;

T1053.003CronEvidence1

persistStealthCron() writes a wrapper script to /usr/local/lib/.cache-update.sh and installs it as a cron entry... const cronLine = `*/${ interval } * * * * ${ p . wrapperPath } >/dev/null 2>&1` ;

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1037.004RC ScriptsEvidence1

persistStealthProfile() writes to /etc/profile.d/.sh.local , which executes the wrapper script in the background on every user login: const profileContent = `[ -x "${ p . wrapperPath }" ] && "${ p . wrapperPath }" >/dev/null 2>&1 & \n ` ;

T1053.003CronEvidence1

persistStealthCron() writes a wrapper script to /usr/local/lib/.cache-update.sh and installs it as a cron entry... const cronLine = `*/${ interval } * * * * ${ p . wrapperPath } >/dev/null 2>&1` ;

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

injector.c attaches to a target process via ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, ...) , locates the first executable memory page from /proc/PID/maps , and patches it with a NOP sled followed by an INT3 breakpoint

Stealth

4 techniques
T1027.011Fileless StorageEvidence1

memfd_exec.c implements fileless execution using the memfd_create syscall... memfd_loader.c extends this to launch the entire RAT from memory... The result: a Node.js process running the RAT entirely from memory, with /proc/PID/exe pointing to /memfd:.node (deleted) and /proc/PID/cmdline showing systemd-userdbd --user . No files on disk.

T1036.004Masquerade Task or ServiceEvidence1

proc_hide.c uses prctl(PR_SET_NAME, ...) to change /proc/PID/comm and overwrites argv[0] in place to scrub /proc/PID/cmdline ... The default target name is systemd-userdbd ... agent_launcher.c takes this further: it copies the Node.js binary to /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-userdbd ... so even /proc/PID/exe points to a path that looks legitimate.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

injector.c attaches to a target process via ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, ...) , locates the first executable memory page from /proc/PID/maps , and patches it with a NOP sled followed by an INT3 breakpoint

T1574.006Dynamic Linker HijackingEvidence1

libcache.so: LD_PRELOAD file hiding ... Once deployed to /etc/ld.so.preload , this library loads into every new process on the system, hiding the RAT’s persistence artifacts from ls , find , stat , and any tool that uses libc directory enumeration.

Discovery

4 techniques
T1049System Network Connections DiscoveryEvidence1

network-enum netstat Parse /proc/net/tcp and /proc/net/udp

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

process-list ps Process enumeration from /proc

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

sysinfo sysinfo Hostname, arch, CPUs, memory, OS release, user info

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

filesystem cd , upload , download Directory traversal and base64 file transfer ... file-search find Recursive glob search across the filesystem

Collection

1 technique
T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

screen-live screen_start , screen_stop , screen_status Live screen streaming ... The final implementation auto-detects the active graphical session using loginctl , reads the target user’s DISPLAY and XAUTHORITY from /proc/PID/environ ... The server-side viewer exposes captured frames over HTTP on port 5555.

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

MYRA uses a plugin architecture with 13 modules. The client connects to the C2 over TCP with length-prefixed JSON framing (4-byte big-endian header followed by a JSON body).

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

filesystem cd , upload , download Directory traversal and base64 file transfer

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

filesystem cd , upload , download Directory traversal and base64 file transfer

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

3 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
2 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Other
1 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 day ago
email●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 day ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 day ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching3

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping15

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.