Malware

WinDefCtl

For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

5 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Persistence

1 technique

T1546.012Image File Execution Options InjectionEvidence1

According to the project's documentation, the kill mode performs a two-stage operation. First, it bypasses Microsoft Defender Tamper Protection by modifying the IFEO through an offline registry hive workflow.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique

T1546.012Image File Execution Options InjectionEvidence1

Stealth

1 technique

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence1

The next stage downloads update.exe from the attacker-controlled infrastructure using a browser-like User-Agent before saving it as: %TEMP%\svchost.exe

Command and Control

2 techniques

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

HTTP(S) used to retrieve staged payloads.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

Once AMSI protections have been bypassed, the loader downloads stage.ps1 from the attacker-controlled infrastructure and immediately executes it in memory using IEX

Other

1 technique

T1562.001Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

followed by an in-memory Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) patch that bypassed AMSI scanning for subsequent PowerShell execution... the actor then targeted host defenses by executing WinDefCtl... leveraging Image File Execution Options (IFEO) manipulation and a kernel driver ( kvckiller.sys ) to interfere with Microsoft Defender components

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

3 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app

Hashes

2 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other

1 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting

hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in apptoday

uri●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in apptoday

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

1 SOURCESView more in app

levelblue spiderlabs blogNews

Jul 6, 2026

From Phishing to Persistence: A CrySome RAT Infection Chain Analysis

An open-source utility repurposed by the threat actor to weaken Microsoft Defender before deploying CrySome RAT. It uses IFEO manipulation and the kvckiller.sys driver to interfere with Defender processes and services.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.

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IOC matching3

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping5

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.

Back to malware

Malware

WinDefCtl

For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

Start free trial

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

5 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Persistence

1 technique

T1546.012Image File Execution Options InjectionEvidence1

Privilege Escalation

1 technique

T1546.012Image File Execution Options InjectionEvidence1

Stealth

1 technique

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence1

The next stage downloads update.exe from the attacker-controlled infrastructure using a browser-like User-Agent before saving it as: %TEMP%\svchost.exe

Command and Control

2 techniques

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

HTTP(S) used to retrieve staged payloads.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

Once AMSI protections have been bypassed, the loader downloads stage.ps1 from the attacker-controlled infrastructure and immediately executes it in memory using IEX

Other

1 technique

T1562.001Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

3 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app

Hashes

2 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other

1 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting

hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in apptoday

uri●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in apptoday

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

1 SOURCESView more in app

levelblue spiderlabs blogNews

Jul 6, 2026

From Phishing to Persistence: A CrySome RAT Infection Chain Analysis

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

Start free trial

IOC matching3

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping5

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.