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Mallory
CriticalPublic exploit

Unauthenticated OS Command Injection in Linksys E-Series Routers

IdentifiersCVE-2025-34037CWE-78· Improper Neutralization of Special…

CVE-2025-34037 is an OS command injection vulnerability affecting various Linksys E-Series router models, with possible impact extending to additional Linksys product lines including WAG, WAP, WES, WET, and WRT-series devices and Wireless-N access points/routers. The flaw is present in the /tmUnblock.cgi and /hndUnblock.cgi CGI endpoints exposed over HTTP on port 8080. These scripts improperly process attacker-controlled input supplied via the ttcp_ip parameter without adequate sanitization, allowing shell metacharacters or injected commands to be passed to the underlying operating system. Because the vulnerable endpoints are reachable without authentication, a remote attacker can exploit the issue by sending crafted HTTP requests directly to the device.

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ANALYST BRIEF

Impact, mitigation & remediation

What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.

Impact

What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.

Successful exploitation allows unauthenticated remote attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands on the affected router. In practice, this can be used to download and launch malware payloads, as reported with TheMoon worm activity deploying a MIPS ELF payload. Impact includes full compromise of the device, botnet enrollment, persistence via modified device state or dropped binaries/scripts, traffic interception or manipulation, use of the router as a pivot point into internal networks, and disruption of routing or management functions. The content states the vulnerability was exploited in the wild, with exploitation evidence observed by the Shadowserver Foundation on 2025-02-06 UTC.

Mitigation

If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.

Until patched, restrict or disable access to the web management interface, especially HTTP on port 8080, from untrusted networks. Do not expose router administration interfaces directly to the internet. Limit management access to trusted internal hosts or a dedicated management network, enforce firewall/ACL rules, and disable remote administration if not required. Monitor for suspicious requests to /tmUnblock.cgi and /hndUnblock.cgi, signs of malware download/execution, and unexpected outbound connections indicative of botnet activity. Given reported in-the-wild exploitation, incident response review of potentially exposed devices is warranted.

Remediation

Patch, then assume compromise.

Apply vendor firmware updates that address CVE-2025-34037 for affected Linksys devices as soon as they are available from Linksys. Identify all exposed Linksys E-Series and potentially affected related product families, verify firmware versions, and upgrade to fixed releases provided by the vendor. If a device is end-of-life or no patched firmware is available, replace the device with supported hardware.
PUBLIC EXPLOITS

Exploits

1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.

VALID 1 / 1 TOTALView more in app
CVE-2025-34037MaturityPoCVerified exploit

This repository is a small standalone Python exploit for unauthenticated command injection/RCE against vulnerable Linksys router CGI endpoints, primarily tmUnblock.cgi, with hndUnblock.cgi noted as an alternative. The repository contains only two files: a README describing the vulnerability, affected models, and usage, and a single executable script, exploit.py, which is the main entry point. The exploit works by crafting raw HTTP POST requests to the vulnerable CGI endpoint and injecting shell commands through the ttcp_ip form parameter. It percent-encodes the POST body, includes a Basic Authorization header with arbitrary credentials, and sends the request directly over a TCP socket to the target web service on port 80. The script first removes any previous payload from /tmp/c0d3z, then uploads an embedded base64-encoded MIPS little-endian ELF bind shell in 20-byte chunks using repeated echo -en commands with octal byte escapes. After staging, it chmods the file to make it executable, runs it via another injected command, waits briefly, and then connects to the bind shell on TCP port 4444. Capabilities include unauthenticated remote code execution, payload staging to the target filesystem, permission modification, payload execution, and an interactive post-exploitation shell over the bind socket. The exploit is operational rather than a simple proof of concept because it contains a complete hardcoded payload and an interactive shell handler. No external C2 infrastructure is used; all communication is direct between the attacker and the target router. The main fingerprintable artifacts are the vulnerable CGI paths, the temporary payload file /tmp/c0d3z, the default target IP 192.168.8.100, and the bind shell listener on port 4444.

TaxanehhDisclosed Mar 26, 2026pythonmarkdownnetwork
EXPOSURE SURFACE

Affected products & vendors

Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.

VendorProductType
LinksysE1000application
LinksysE1200application
LinksysE1500application
LinksysE2000hardware
LinksysE2500application
LinksysE3000hardware

Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets are affected, which adversaries are exploiting it right now, which detections to deploy, and what to do tonight.
Exposure mapping

Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.

Threat actor evidence

Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.

Associated malware1

Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.

Detection signatures1

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Vendor-by-vendor mapping

Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.

Social activity9

Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.