Signed Integer Overflow in lighttpd burl_normalize_2F_to_slash_fix
A signed integer overflow exists in lighttpd before 1.4.54, specifically in the function burl_normalize_2F_to_slash_fix in burl.c. This can be triggered by a crafted HTTP GET request (e.g., /%2F?), but only when a new feature introduced in 1.4.50 is explicitly enabled in the configuration. The overflow leads to an explicit abort() call, causing the application to exit.
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