Arbitrary command execution via malicious project .zed/settings.json LSP configuration in Zed (< 0.218.2-pre)
Zed code editor versions prior to 0.218.2-pre load Language Server Protocol (LSP) configuration from a project-local settings.json located under the project’s .zed directory. A malicious project can supply an LSP entry whose configuration includes arbitrary shell commands; when Zed processes the LSP entry (e.g., upon opening the project / relevant file), those commands may be executed on the host with the privileges of the user running Zed. The issue is addressed in 0.218.2-pre by implementing a worktree trust mechanism to prevent untrusted project settings from being applied without user trust.
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Impact, mitigation & remediation
What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.
Impact
What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
Mitigation
If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.
.zed/settings.json as untrusted input: carefully review the contents of .zed/settings.json before opening new/untrusted projects in Zed, and avoid opening projects from untrusted sources.Remediation
Patch, then assume compromise.
Exploits
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No public exploit code observed for this vulnerability.
Affected products & vendors
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Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
Recent activity
8 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
The version that knows your environment.
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Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.