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Mallory
Critical

Unsafe Deserialization of JMS ObjectMessage in Apache Camel

IdentifiersCVE-2026-40860CWE-502· Deserialization of Untrusted Data

CVE-2026-40860 is an unsafe deserialization vulnerability in Apache Camel JMS-related components, including camel-jms and the equivalent JmsBinding implementation in camel-sjms, with the same vulnerable handling reached transitively through camel-sjms2 and camel-amqp, and affecting other JMS-family components built on JmsComponent such as camel-activemq and camel-activemq6. The flaw is in JMS consumer-side handling of incoming javax.jms.ObjectMessage instances: JmsBinding.extractBodyFromJms() in camel-jms, and the corresponding JmsBinding logic in camel-sjms, call ObjectMessage.getObject() and deserialize attacker-controlled message content without applying an ObjectInputFilter, class allowlist, or class denylist. The vulnerable path is reached when Camel acts as a JMS consumer and the mapJmsMessage option is enabled, which is the default. As a result, a crafted ObjectMessage published to a queue or topic consumed by a vulnerable Camel application can trigger deserialization of untrusted data.

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ANALYST BRIEF

Impact, mitigation & remediation

What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.

Impact

What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.

Successful exploitation can result in remote code execution in the context of the vulnerable Camel application, provided a usable deserialization gadget chain is present on the application classpath. Because exploitation occurs during message consumption, an attacker with the ability to publish to a consumed queue or topic may be able to execute arbitrary code, compromise the application process, access or modify application data, pivot within the environment, or disrupt service availability depending on the privileges and environment of the Camel runtime.

Mitigation

If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.

If immediate upgrade is not possible, reduce exposure by preventing untrusted parties from publishing JMS ObjectMessage payloads to queues or topics consumed by Camel, disabling or avoiding ObjectMessage-based workflows where feasible, and reviewing Camel JMS consumer configurations that rely on the default mapJmsMessage behavior. Additional risk reduction can be achieved by limiting reachable gadget chains on the application classpath and enforcing broker- and application-level controls so only trusted producers can send to affected destinations. However, the authoritative fix is to upgrade to a patched Camel version.

Remediation

Patch, then assume compromise.

Upgrade Apache Camel to a fixed release. Apache states the issue is fixed in 4.14.7, 4.18.2, and 4.20.0. Users should upgrade to 4.20.0 where possible; users on the 4.14.x LTS stream should upgrade to 4.14.7, and users on the 4.18.x stream should upgrade to 4.18.2.
PUBLIC EXPLOITS

Exploits

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VALID 0 / 0 TOTALView more in app

No public exploit code observed for this vulnerability.

EXPOSURE SURFACE

Affected products & vendors

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VendorProductType
Apache Software FoundationCamelapplication

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Threat actor evidence

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Detection signatures

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Social activity7

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