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CVE-2024-7387 is a path-traversal vulnerability in OpenShift Builder. In builds using the Docker strategy, a malicious BuildConfig can use the secret destinationDir attribute to traverse paths and overwrite executable files within the privileged build container. This can result in command injection and execution of attacker-controlled commands on the OpenShift node hosting the builder container.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
Repository is a minimal PoC for CVE-2024-7387 targeting OpenShift builds. Structure: (1) `usr_bin` is a symlink containing `/usr/bin`, used to coerce secret mounting into the system binary directory; (2) `Dockerfile` runs `ls -la && cat pwn.txt` so any payload output written to `pwn.txt` becomes visible in build logs; (3) `README.md` provides step-by-step exploitation using OpenShift objects. Exploit flow described: create a Secret (`malicious-secret`) with a key named `cp` whose value is a bash script. Mount that secret in a BuildConfig with `destinationDir: usr_bin`. Because `usr_bin` is a symlink to `/usr/bin`, the mount overwrites `/usr/bin/cp` with the attacker script. A second Secret (`trigger-secret`) is mounted normally; OpenShift internally invokes `cp` while handling/copying build inputs, which now executes the malicious `/usr/bin/cp`. Payload capability: node compromise/persistence. The script mounts a host partition (`/dev/vda4`) to `/mnt/h`, generates an SSH keypair, appends the public key to the worker node’s `core` user `authorized_keys` under the Fedora CoreOS ostree path, fixes permissions/ownership, and writes the private key into `/tmp/build/inputs/pwn.txt`. The Dockerfile then prints `pwn.txt` during the build, allowing the attacker to recover the private key from logs and SSH to `core@WORKER_IP`.
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5 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A previously noted critical OpenShift vulnerability mentioned only as background in vendor security history.
A path-traversal vulnerability in the OpenShift builder component that allows command injection in a privileged BuildContainer using the Docker build strategy.
A critical vulnerability in Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4's openshift4/ose-docker-builder component that allows arbitrary command execution on an OpenShift node, potentially enabling privilege escalation and takeover of the node running the container.
A critical vulnerability in Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4's openshift4/ose-docker-builder component that allows arbitrary command execution on an OpenShift node, potentially enabling privilege escalation and takeover of the node running the container.
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