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Out-of-bounds write in Zephyr recvmsg() ancillary data handling

IdentifiersCVE-2026-10643CWE-787

CVE-2026-10643 is a memory corruption vulnerability in Zephyr’s IP socket recvmsg() ancillary-data handling, specifically in insert_pktinfo() in subsys/net/lib/sockets/sockets_inet.c. The implementation validated the user-supplied msg_control buffer using only the ancillary payload length (msg->msg_controllen < pktinfo_len) before writing a full control message composed of an aligned cmsg header plus payload. Because the check omitted the cmsg header size, undersized control buffers could pass validation and then be overrun during control message construction. For example, for IPv4 IP_PKTINFO on a 64-bit target, buffers in the 16-27 byte range can pass the check even though one control message element requires 28 bytes. This results in a fixed-size out-of-bounds write of up to approximately one cmsg header (~12 bytes) past the end of the buffer. In CONFIG_USERSPACE builds, recvmsg verification allocates a kernel-heap copy of the control buffer sized to msg_controllen and executes the vulnerable path against it, making the overflow a kernel-heap corruption reachable by an unprivileged userspace thread. In supervisor mode, the overflow corrupts the caller-provided buffer. Affected versions are Zephyr v3.6.0 through v4.4.0.

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Impact, mitigation & remediation

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Impact

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Successful exploitation causes memory corruption via an out-of-bounds write in ancillary control-message handling. In CONFIG_USERSPACE configurations, an unprivileged userspace thread can corrupt kernel heap memory, which can lead to kernel instability, crashes, denial of service, and potentially further exploitation depending on heap layout and target-specific hardening. In supervisor mode, the overwrite corrupts the caller’s buffer. The overwritten bytes are partially influenced by received packet data, including the destination IP stored in ipi_addr, which may improve attacker control over corruption contents.

Mitigation

If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.

Until patched, reduce exposure by avoiding CONFIG_USERSPACE where feasible, disabling or not using ancillary data options that reach the vulnerable path such as IP_PKTINFO, IPV6_RECVPKTINFO, hoplimit, and timestamping on UDP/IP sockets, and ensuring applications do not call recvmsg() with undersized msg_control buffers. Restrict untrusted userspace code from accessing affected socket functionality where possible.

Remediation

Patch, then assume compromise.

Update Zephyr to a patched release that corrects ancillary buffer capacity validation in recvmsg() by checking the full required control-message space with NET_CMSG_SPACE(pktinfo_len) rather than only the payload length. The corrected implementation returns -ENOMEM when the supplied control buffer is too small. All deployments using affected versions 3.6.0 through 4.4.0 should be upgraded to a fixed version.
PUBLIC EXPLOITS

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VALID 0 / 0 TOTALView more in app

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