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Path Traversal in Notepad++ trusted directory validation

IdentifiersCVE-2026-52884CWE-22

CVE-2026-52884 affects Notepad++ v8.9.6.1. The vulnerability is in the trusted-directory validation added around Command::run() in RunDlg.cpp before invoking ShellExecute(). The helper function isInTrustedDirectory() does not canonicalize the candidate path before evaluating it and instead performs a prefix-based trust check using PathIsPrefix() or equivalent logic. Because the check is performed on a non-canonicalized path string, an attacker can supply a path that begins with a trusted directory prefix but then includes traversal sequences such as ...., causing the validation to succeed even though the fully resolved path points outside the trusted directory. This results in improper restriction of a pathname to an intended directory and can allow execution of an executable from an untrusted location.

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Impact, mitigation & remediation

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Impact

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Successful exploitation can bypass Notepad++'s trusted-directory enforcement for executable launch operations. If an attacker can cause Notepad++ to process a crafted path, the application may invoke ShellExecute() on an executable located outside the intended trusted directories. The practical impact is unauthorized program execution in the security context of the current user, which may lead to remote code execution if the path can be attacker-controlled through a remote or untrusted input source.

Mitigation

If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.

Until the fixed version is deployed, avoid workflows that allow Notepad++ to launch executables based on untrusted or externally influenced paths. Restrict use of the affected Run functionality where possible, prevent untrusted content from supplying executable paths, and apply OS or endpoint controls such as application allowlisting to block execution from user-writable or otherwise untrusted directories. Additional mitigation may include validating and normalizing paths before use in any local wrapper or enterprise control around Notepad++.

Remediation

Patch, then assume compromise.

Upgrade Notepad++ to version 8.9.6.2 or later. According to the provided content, the issue is fixed in 8.9.6.2. The remediation should ensure that trusted-directory validation is performed on a canonicalized, fully resolved path before any prefix or containment check is applied, so traversal segments cannot escape the trusted directory after validation.
PUBLIC EXPLOITS

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VALID 0 / 0 TOTALView more in app

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