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TeamTNT is a financially motivated cybercrime group active since at least April 2020 that specializes in compromising cloud-native infrastructure for cryptomining and, in some operations, distributed denial-of-service bot activity. Also styled TeamTnT, the group primarily targets misconfigured or Internet-exposed Docker and Kubernetes services, including Docker APIs, Weave Scope deployments, Kubelet APIs, and Kubernetes API servers with unsafe anonymous-access or authorization configurations. TeamTNT deploys malicious container images masquerading as legitimate Kubernetes components, executes cryptocurrency miners, scans for additional exposed container-management endpoints, and propagates workloads to newly discovered systems. It removes competing malware or containers and checks for cloud-security tooling, demonstrating defense-evasion and resource-hijacking objectives. The group has used process-hiding tools including libprocesshider and the Diamorphine Linux kernel-module rootkit to conceal cryptomining processes. TeamTNT has used shell and batch scripts, curl, and PowerShell to retrieve and execute additional tools. Its malware includes the custom Hildegard family and Black-T variants. Black-T has installed network-scanning tooling and extracted AWS credentials from memory. TeamTNT has also used Ezuri-packed Linux payloads to execute decrypted malware in memory and reduce endpoint-detection visibility. The group has been associated with Kubernetes-to-cloud pivot risks through pod escape and access to cloud instance-metadata services, although such activity is dependent on victim cloud and cluster configuration.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
55 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
35 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
30 additional families tracked in Mallory.
8 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 8 of them exploited in the wild.
This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
The following analytic detects attempts to exploit CVE-2022-26134, an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in Confluence... This activity is significant as it allows attackers to execute arbitrary code on the Confluence server without authentication, potentially leading to full system compromise.
3 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
588 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
TeamTNT appears only in the detection's annotations list.
Conducting attacks against cloud and container environments, including Kubernetes and Docker, to steal AWS credentials and enable lateral movement; previously associated with cryptocurrency mining and credential theft.
Mentioned only as a referenced cryptojacking crew in related/background context; the article itself focuses on an unnamed Monero mining campaign on Linux servers, not on TeamTNT activity.
Listed as one of many threat actors associated with the detection's ATT&CK-style annotations for PowerShell and DNS TXT command-and-control behavior; no specific campaign or activity is described in this reference.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.