TeamTNT is a financially motivated cybercrime threat actor best known for opportunistic attacks against Linux and cloud environments, especially exposed or misconfigured Docker, Kubernetes, and related cloud services. The group has been widely associated with cryptojacking operations, credential harvesting, and persistent backdoor deployment on compromised infrastructure. TeamTNT has also abused container ecosystems by publishing backdoored Docker images to public registries to facilitate follow-on compromise. The actor’s tradecraft centers on cloud-native and Linux-focused intrusion activity. Documented behavior includes targeting exposed Docker API services and unauthenticated JupyterLab instances, launching containers on compromised hosts, and using those footholds to scan for additional victims and propagate laterally across reachable infrastructure. TeamTNT has deployed cryptocurrency miners and backdoors, including use of Tsunami malware, and has used tools such as tmate to maintain covert remote access to compromised Linux servers. The group has also harvested cloud credentials, including searching process environments for AWS-related secrets. Observed post-compromise behavior includes extensive host and environment discovery, such as enumerating system version, architecture, disk partitions, logical volumes, hostname information, attached VGA devices, local IP addressing, and installed security products. TeamTNT commonly relies on shell scripting and native utilities, using tools such as curl and wget for payload retrieval and credential transmission over HTTP, and Base64 decoding within scripts to stage or execute additional components. The group has also established persistence through mechanisms including startup-folder scripts and service-based miner installation. Known aliases in the supplied data are limited to TeamTNT. The actor is primarily tracked as a cloud-focused cryptomining and credential-theft operation rather than a state-sponsored intrusion set.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
57 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
12 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
7 additional families tracked in Mallory.
8 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 8 of them exploited in the wild.
This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
The following analytic detects attempts to exploit CVE-2022-26134, an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in Confluence... This activity is significant as it allows attackers to execute arbitrary code on the Confluence server without authentication, potentially leading to full system compromise.
3 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
126 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Referenced as an example threat actor associated with deploying known cryptominer binaries on Linux systems.
Listed in annotations associated with the credential-access technique.
Mentioned as a commodity-focused cryptomining threat actor used as a comparison point for wallet reuse behavior.
Listed in the detection annotations as a threat actor associated with this analytic context.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.