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UAC-0006 is a financially motivated threat actor tracked by CERT-UA and active since at least 2013. The group is closely associated with repeated SmokeLoader-based phishing campaigns targeting Ukraine, especially financial institutions, accountants, enterprises, and customers of major Ukrainian banks such as PrivatBank. Reporting also links the actor to broader targeting of Ukrainian state and private-sector organizations through socially engineered email campaigns. UAC-0006 commonly relies on phishing for initial access, using invoice- and payment-themed lures, password-protected archives, malicious script attachments, shortcut files, disk image files, and Microsoft Access documents with macros. In observed campaigns, execution chains have used JavaScript, VBScript, PowerShell, and legitimate Windows binaries to evade detection and deliver SmokeLoader. The actor has also exploited CVE-2025-0411 in 7-Zip to bypass Mark-of-the-Web protections and deliver SmokeLoader to Ukrainian targets. After compromise, UAC-0006 has used SmokeLoader as a loader and post-compromise platform to retrieve additional payloads, including TALESHOT and RMS, and to support follow-on fraud activity involving remote banking systems. CERT-UA has warned that the group’s operations are tied to theft of funds from individuals and legal entities, and that renewed fraud against remote banking users often follows periods of SmokeLoader botnet expansion. Observed tradecraft includes use of compromised email accounts, process injection, command and scripting interpreters, persistence mechanisms, and defense-evasion techniques intended to reduce detection by email and endpoint controls. The actor is assessed as Russia-linked in available reporting. Infrastructure patterns cited in public reporting include use of Russian registrars and hosting providers, and some reporting notes overlap between UAC-0006 tradecraft and FIN7. At the same time, UAC-0006 should be distinguished from unrelated SmokeLoader operators that use different infrastructure and targeting patterns.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
13 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
4 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
1 CVE this actor has used in observed campaigns. 1 of them exploited in the wild.
9 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Mentioned only in related content as a financially motivated threat group deploying Smokeloader against PrivatBank in Ukraine; not part of the Bank of Baroda incident itself.
Associated with exploitation of a 7-Zip vulnerability.
Referenced for contrast as a tracked SmokeLoader actor that uses Russian registrars and hosting and targets Ukrainian financial institutions; the report states the ingermany operator is distinct from this actor.
UAC-0006 is conducting phishing campaigns targeting Ukrainian organizations, including PrivatBank, using SmokeLoader malware to steal credentials and sensitive data.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.