CyberVolk is an India-origin, pro-Russian hacktivist collective also known as GLORIAMIST, GLORIAMIST India, and Solntsevskaya Bratva. It emerged in its current form in May 2024 and launched a ransomware-as-a-service operation in June 2024. The group conducts distributed denial-of-service and ransomware attacks against public and government entities it portrays as opposing Russian interests or supporting Ukraine. Its ideological alignment does not establish Russian state sponsorship. CyberVolk used its branded ransomware against Japanese organizations during the 2024 #OpJP campaign, including government meteorological and oceanographic organizations and the Japan Foundation. CyberVolk relies heavily on commodity malware and repurposed ransomware source code. Its early Windows ransomware was written in C++ and derived from leaked AzzaSec code, sharing a codebase with Invisible/Doubleface ransomware. The collective also promoted Doubleface, HexaLocker, and Parano ransomware, and distributed a Python-based information stealer derived from LBX-Grabber and a PHP webshell. These tooling and promotional relationships do not establish that the associated groups are CyberVolk subgroups. Following disruption of its Telegram infrastructure and a period of reduced activity, CyberVolk returned in August 2025 with VolkLocker, also branded CyberVolk 2.x. This Go-based ransomware-as-a-service platform supports Windows and Linux and uses Telegram automation for payload generation, command and control, affiliate support, victim messaging, and decryption management. VolkLocker employs AES-256-GCM encryption, Windows UAC bypass, system and process discovery, virtualization checks, security-tool termination, and deletion of volume shadow copies. It also includes timer-triggered destructive functionality. Analyzed builds exposed master encryption keys in the executable and in plaintext on compromised systems, creating opportunities for recovery without payment; this flaw is not present reliably across all builds. CyberVolk additionally markets standalone remote-access trojans and keyloggers, combining politically framed attacks with commercial malware services.
Who, where, and from where this actor operates. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
18 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt.
12 malware families Mallory has associated with this actor across public reporting.
7 additional families tracked in Mallory.
30 indicators attributed to this actor. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.