Suckfly is a China-linked espionage threat actor known for intrusions against government and related targets, including activity targeting India. The group has been associated with credential access, internal reconnaissance, and defense-evasion tradecraft. Observed behavior includes use of signed credential-dumping utilities to obtain victim account credentials, abuse of valid accounts to move through victim environments as legitimate users, command-line driven tooling for post-compromise operations, and network service discovery to identify reachable internal hosts and exposed services. Suckfly has also used stolen code-signing certificates to sign malware, indicating an effort to reduce suspicion and evade security controls. The actor is commonly tracked under the name Suckfly.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
23 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
1 malware family attributed to this actor across reporting.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Listed as an associated threat actor in the detection annotation for a Linux usermod root UID set analytic; no specific campaign or activity is described in this reference.
Listed as a threat actor associated with Azure Active Directory account takeover, persistence, privilege escalation, and related cloud-focused post-compromise activity detected via PowerShell module installation.
Listed as a threat actor associated with Windows Command Shell execution behavior relevant to this detection.
Referenced as a threat actor associated with credential access behavior, specifically techniques involving unsecured credentials and OS credential dumping in the context of LAPS password gathering via PowerShell.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.