Suckfly
Suckfly is a threat actor referenced in the provided content as using command-line driven tools, stolen certificates to sign malware, credential dumping, valid accounts, and network service discovery. The content states that several tools used by Suckfly were command-line driven, aligning with Windows Command Shell activity (T1059.003). It also states that Suckfly used stolen certificates to sign its malware. For credential access, the content links Suckfly to OS Credential Dumping (T1003) and states that it used dumped legitimate account credentials to navigate victim internal networks as though it were the legitimate account owner, corresponding to Valid Accounts (T1078). For discovery, the content links Suckfly to Network Service Discovery (T1046) and states that it scanned victim internal networks for hosts with ports 8080, 5900, and 40 open. No additional aliases, sub-groups, or attribution details are directly provided in the content beyond the name Suckfly.
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Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Tradecraft
20 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
Associated malware families
1 malware family attributed to this actor across reporting.
Recent activity
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Listed as a threat actor associated with Azure Active Directory account takeover, persistence, privilege escalation, and related cloud-focused post-compromise activity detected via PowerShell module installation.
Listed as a threat actor associated with Windows Command Shell execution behavior relevant to this detection.
Referenced as a threat actor associated with credential access behavior, specifically techniques involving unsecured credentials and OS credential dumping in the context of LAPS password gathering via PowerShell.
Listed as a threat actor associated with the Valid Accounts technique in the context of AWS SAML provider update detection and potential federated credential abuse.
The version that knows your environment.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.