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Magecart is an umbrella term for multiple financially motivated cybercriminal groups and campaigns that compromise e-commerce environments to conduct web-based payment-card skimming. Magecart activity targets online checkout processes, particularly on Magento/Adobe Commerce, WooCommerce, and other merchant platforms. Operators inject malicious client-side JavaScript or server-side code to capture payment-card numbers, expiration dates, CVVs, cardholder details, billing addresses, and other customer data, then transmit or stage the data for later retrieval and resale. Magecart operations use diverse initial-access and delivery paths, including vulnerable e-commerce software and plugins, compromised administration interfaces, altered third-party scripts, malicious Google Tag Manager containers, and tampered payment-gateway components. Common tradecraft includes fake payment-form overlays, dynamic payment-field mapping, payload obfuscation and encryption, lookalike analytics or tag-management code, rotating delivery infrastructure, use of trusted third-party services, browser storage or cookies to retain captured data, and exfiltration disguised as ordinary image or analytics requests. Some campaigns conceal skimmer payloads in benign-looking image assets or use server-side files to stage stolen records. Named activity associated with the Magecart ecosystem includes long-running ATMZOW operations, which have used malicious Google Tag Manager containers against e-commerce sites.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
34 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
4 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
134 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Conducting web skimming attacks against e-commerce checkout pages by abusing trusted services such as Google Tag Manager and Stripe to load payment-card skimmers and exfiltrate stolen customer payment and personal data.
Conducting web skimming attacks against e-commerce checkout pages by abusing trusted services such as Google Tag Manager, Stripe API infrastructure, and in a variant, Google Firestore, to load skimmer code and exfiltrate stolen payment data.
Payment-card skimming activity used in exploitation of the FunnelKit Funnel Builder vulnerability to steal checkout data from WooCommerce stores.
Conducting web skimming/payment card theft by injecting malicious JavaScript into ecommerce checkout pages and disguising it as legitimate analytics or tag manager code.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.