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APT32, commonly known as OceanLotus, is a Vietnamese cyberespionage threat actor also tracked as SeaLotus, APT-C-00, and G0050. It has targeted Southeast Asian government and business entities, as well as international organizations with interests in Vietnam. Confirmed activity includes intrusion operations against Vietnamese financial-services organizations using the PHOREAL/RIZZO backdoor. The group has used spearphishing attachments for initial access, NTFS alternate data streams to conceal payloads, and in-memory execution or process injection to evade detection. PHOREAL/RIZZO operations have used malicious unsigned modules to inject a backdoor into legitimate Windows processes, supporting victim characterization and follow-on post-exploitation. Activity assessed to overlap with APT32 has also targeted Vietnamese agribusiness and used loaders and backdoors capable of file operations, token impersonation, process hollowing, shellcode injection, encrypted HTTP command-and-control, and named-pipe command-and-control.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
60 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
39 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
34 additional families tracked in Mallory.
6 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 6 of them exploited in the wild.
APT32 has used CVE-2016-7255 to escalate privileges.
...has exploited Office vulnerabilities such as CVE-2017-11882...
This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.
"A critical remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability, identified as CVE-2025-55182 and dubbed React2Shell, exists within the React Server Components (RSC) architecture, allowing unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary code..."
The following analytic detects when su runs from a page-cache-corrupted binary... This activity is significant because it indicates a possible privilege escalation attempt, allowing a user to gain root access... CVE CVE-2026-31431 ... References ... copy-fail-CVE-2026-31431
1 more CVE tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
739 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
APT32 is listed in the detection's annotations for MITRE ATT&CK technique T1059 (Command and Scripting Interpreter).
Listed as an annotated threat actor associated with the Socat detection; no actor-specific activity is described.
Included only as an annotated threat-actor association for Socat listener-and-executable binding; no APT32-specific activity is described.
Referenced solely as an ATT&CK-associated group for Windows built-in account renaming/local-account abuse; no campaign or activity is described.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.