Star Blizzard is a Russian state-linked spear-phishing and cyber-espionage threat actor assessed by multiple Western governments to operate on behalf of the Russian Federal Security Service, specifically FSB Centre 18. The group is widely tracked under the aliases SEABORGIUM, COLDRIVER, Callisto Group, TA446, BlueCharlie, TAG-53, and related variants. It has been active since at least the mid-2010s and has conducted sustained information-gathering operations, including campaigns targeting democratic institutions and politically sensitive individuals in the United Kingdom and elsewhere. The actor primarily targets government and public-sector entities, defense organizations, academia, think tanks, NGOs, journalists, politicians, civil society groups, and individuals with expertise or involvement in Russian affairs, Ukraine, NATO, and Eastern Europe. Reported victim geography shows a strong concentration on the United Kingdom and United States, with additional targeting across other NATO countries, Ukraine, the Baltics, the Nordics, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Russian and Belarusian opposition or exile communities. Star Blizzard is best known for highly tailored spear-phishing that relies on extensive reconnaissance of victims’ professional networks, interests, and trusted contacts. Operators commonly impersonate known associates, respected experts, or event organizers using fraudulent email and social-media personas, and often begin with benign conversation over an extended period to build rapport before delivering phishing content. The group frequently targets personal email accounts to evade enterprise defenses and has used lures themed around conferences, policy discussions, shared documents, and other contextually relevant subjects. Operationally, Star Blizzard has used credential-harvesting infrastructure that imitates legitimate sign-in workflows and has leveraged the EvilGinx adversary-in-the-middle framework to steal both credentials and authenticated web session cookies. This enables session hijacking and bypass of multi-factor authentication. After account compromise, the actor accesses victim mailboxes, steals emails and attachments, creates mail-forwarding rules for persistence and collection, harvests contact lists and mailing-list data, and uses compromised accounts to launch follow-on phishing against additional targets. The group has also been associated with hack-and-leak activity and politically motivated interference operations, including the selective disclosure of stolen material to sow distrust and influence public discourse. UK authorities publicly attributed a long-running campaign against British political figures and democratic institutions to officers of FSB Centre 18 and identified individuals linked to the operation, including Ruslan Peretyatko and Andrey Korinets. Star Blizzard has additionally been linked in reporting to phishing activity against Russian opposition figures abroad and to broader Russian intelligence efforts targeting secure messaging users for account access and intelligence collection. Star Blizzard’s dominant function is espionage in support of Russian state objectives, though some operations have blended intelligence collection with influence activity. The actor is adaptive and has repeatedly changed infrastructure and phishing tradecraft in response to public exposure while maintaining a consistent focus on social engineering, credential theft, session theft, and exploitation of trusted communications channels.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
48 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
15 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
10 additional families tracked in Mallory.
7 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 7 of them exploited in the wild.
This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.
The exploit chains six CVEs: CVE-2025-31277, CVE-2025-43529, CVE-2026-20700, CVE-2025-14174, CVE-2025-43510, and CVE-2025-43520.
The exploit chains six CVEs: CVE-2025-31277, CVE-2025-43529, CVE-2026-20700, CVE-2025-14174, CVE-2025-43510, and CVE-2025-43520.
The exploit chains six CVEs: CVE-2025-31277, CVE-2025-43529, CVE-2026-20700, CVE-2025-14174, CVE-2025-43510, and CVE-2025-43520.
The exploit chains six CVEs: CVE-2025-31277, CVE-2025-43529, CVE-2026-20700, CVE-2025-14174, CVE-2025-43510, and CVE-2025-43520.
2 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
230 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Mentioned only as one of several actors in broader conflict-related reporting.
Conducts credential theft, intelligence collection, political targeting, and influence support against political figures, civil society, journalists, academia, and democratic organizations.
Named as a Centre 16 subunit involved in interference with UK politics and democratic processes.
Listed as an associated threat actor in the detection annotation for a Linux usermod root UID set analytic; no specific campaign or activity is described in this reference.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.