Star Blizzard is a Russia-linked cyber espionage threat actor widely tracked under aliases including COLDRIVER, Callisto, Callisto Group, Seaborgium, TA446, UNC4057, BlueCharlie, Gossamer Bear, and related name variants. Multiple governments have publicly linked the group to the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), and reporting has associated it with FSB structures including Centre 18; some government reporting has also described it as a Centre 16 subunit. The actor has been implicated in espionage, credential theft, and information operations aligned with Kremlin interests, including interference in political and democratic processes. The group is best known for highly tailored spearphishing and credential-harvesting campaigns against high-value individuals and organizations. Typical targets include government and military personnel, diplomats, former intelligence and defense officials, parliamentarians, journalists, think tanks, universities, NGOs, civil society organizations, Russian and Belarusian opposition figures, independent media, policy experts, and organizations involved in Ukraine-related issues. Targeting has spanned the United Kingdom, United States, NATO countries, Europe more broadly, and Russian dissidents abroad. Star Blizzard commonly uses impersonation-based social engineering, registering or operating spoofed accounts that mimic trusted contacts, subject-matter experts, colleagues, funders, or officials. Its phishing operations often rely on plausible professional pretexts and fake protected or encrypted document lures, especially PDF-themed workflows, to drive victims to credential theft pages. The actor has used adversary-in-the-middle techniques and incorporated the Evilginx framework into spearphishing activity to capture passwords, session material, and multi-factor authentication data. Observed tradecraft also includes JavaScript-based redirection from actor-controlled infrastructure to phishing frameworks, browser and system fingerprinting, use of cloud storage services to host malicious payloads, and delivery of malware through malicious document lures. Open-source reporting has also linked separate activity by the actor to malware delivery, including the SPICA backdoor. Beyond account compromise for intelligence collection, Star Blizzard has been associated with hack-and-leak activity in which stolen information was later exposed to shape political narratives. Public reporting has linked the actor to operations affecting UK politics and democratic processes, including targeting parliamentarians and politically sensitive institutions, and to campaigns against U.S. government-linked targets, defense-related entities, and research organizations. The actor has also been connected to phishing waves targeting messaging-platform users and high-risk communities, particularly where access to communications would yield military, political, or personal intelligence. Star Blizzard operates with persistent, target-aware tradecraft rather than broad indiscriminate malware distribution. Its campaigns frequently emphasize reconnaissance, relationship mapping, and exploitation of trust within professional or activist networks. This makes the actor particularly relevant to diplomatic, policy, defense, civil society, and opposition ecosystems where email and messaging account compromise can enable both intelligence collection and downstream influence operations.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
50 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
13 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
8 additional families tracked in Mallory.
7 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 7 of them exploited in the wild.
This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.
The exploit chains six CVEs: CVE-2025-31277, CVE-2025-43529, CVE-2026-20700, CVE-2025-14174, CVE-2025-43510, and CVE-2025-43520.
The exploit chains six CVEs: CVE-2025-31277, CVE-2025-43529, CVE-2026-20700, CVE-2025-14174, CVE-2025-43510, and CVE-2025-43520.
The exploit chains six CVEs: CVE-2025-31277, CVE-2025-43529, CVE-2026-20700, CVE-2025-14174, CVE-2025-43510, and CVE-2025-43520.
The exploit chains six CVEs: CVE-2025-31277, CVE-2025-43529, CVE-2026-20700, CVE-2025-14174, CVE-2025-43510, and CVE-2025-43520.
2 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
190 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Conducts credential theft, intelligence collection, political targeting, and influence support against political figures, civil society, journalists, academia, and democratic organizations.
Named as a Centre 16 subunit involved in interference with UK politics and democratic processes.
Conducted a phishing campaign targeting Russian opposition-linked individuals and regime opponents abroad.
Previously reported Russian espionage actor associated here with similar messenger-account phishing and intelligence collection activity.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.