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Mallory
Threat actor

Cyber Army of Russia Reborn

Updated 1 day ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days11 mentions · peak 2 in a dayToday
CVEs0Associated
Malware0Families
ATT&CK20Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
Origin
🇷🇺 Russia
Motivation
Hacktivism
Targets
USUA
Capabilities
DDOSInitial accessReconnaissanceScanningBrute forcePost exploitationDefense evasion
Also known ascarrcarr_(cyber_army_of_russia_reborn)Cyber Army of Russia Reborn (CARR)cyber_army_of_russia_reborncyberarmy_of_russia_reborncyberarmy_of_russia_reborn_(carr)cyberarmyofrussia_reborncyberarmyofrussia_reborn_(carr)cyberarmyofrussia_reborn1

Cyber Army of Russia Reborn (CARR), also styled CyberArmyofRussia_Reborn, is a Russian state-backed, pro-Russian hacktivist group active since early 2022. It conducts distributed denial-of-service attacks, website defacements, and disruptive intrusions into industrial control systems in support of Russia’s war against Ukraine and broader geopolitical interests. U.S. authorities link its creation and financing to Russia’s military intelligence service, particularly GRU Unit 74455, and have alleged that the GRU directed its targeting. Initially focused on online disruption, CARR expanded into industrial control system attacks in late 2023. Its targets include public drinking-water and wastewater systems, agricultural facilities, food processors, energy organizations, and government resources. Documented U.S. operations include water-system manipulation in 2024 that caused tanks to overflow and a November 2024 intrusion at a Los Angeles meat-processing facility that spoiled meat and triggered an ammonia leak. CARR exploits poorly secured, internet-accessible operational technology, particularly human-machine interfaces reachable through Virtual Network Computing services. Its tradecraft includes discovering exposed services, attempting weak or default credentials, and abusing legitimate graphical controls to alter operational parameters. Associated activity includes changing setpoints and credentials, suppressing alarms, and interfering with operators’ visibility or control. These relatively unsophisticated techniques can produce physical damage without sophisticated malware. The group uses Telegram to recruit participants, coordinate activity, promote pro-Russian narratives, and publish attack footage; its public claims can exaggerate actual effects. CARR collaborates with NoName057(16) and has close personnel and operational ties to Z-Pentest. A multinational assessment identifies Z-Pentest as an offshoot established in September 2024 by CARR administrators and a NoName057(16) administrator. CARR’s publicly identified leadership includes Yuliya Pankratova, known as YUliYA, and primary hacker Denis Degtyarenko, known as Dena.

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Operational profile

Targeting

Who, where, and from where this actor operates. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Utilities
  • Energy
  • Food, Beverage & Tobacco
  • Government & Administration
  • Consumer Staples Distribution & Retail
  • Capital Goods
  • Commercial & Professional Services
  • Consumer Services
  • Financial Services
  • Materials
  • Media & Entertainment
  • Military

Where they target

Geographies tied to known operations.

  • United States
  • Ukraine
  • Spain
  • Poland
  • Belarus
  • Canada
  • Denmark
  • France
  • Mexico
  • Norway

Where they're from

Attributed origin per open-source reporting.

  • Russia
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

20 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt.

11 of 15 tactics24 techniques
= intelligence reports citing the technique
TA0043Reconnaissance2 techniques
T1591Gather Victim Org Information
T1595Active Scanning
T1595.002Vulnerability Scanning
TA0042Resource Development2 techniques
T1583Acquire Infrastructure
T1583.003Virtual Private Server
T1583.006Web Services
T1587Develop Capabilities
TA0001Initial Access1 technique
T1133×2External Remote Services
TA0003Persistence1 technique
T1133×2External Remote Services
TA0006Credential Access1 technique
T1110×2Brute Force
T1110.003×2Password Spraying
TA0007Discovery1 technique
T1046Network Service Discovery
TA0008Lateral Movement1 technique
T1021×4Remote Services
T1021.005×3VNC
TA0009Collection1 technique
T1005Data from Local System
TA0011Command and Control1 technique
T1573×3Encrypted Channel
TA0010Exfiltration2 techniques
T1537Transfer Data to Cloud Account
T1567Exfiltration Over Web Service
TA0040Impact5 techniques
T1485×2Data Destruction
T1486Data Encrypted for Impact
T1491Defacement
T1491.001Internal Defacement
T1498×17Network Denial of Service
T1499Endpoint Denial of Service
FAQ

Frequently asked questions

Who does Cyber Army of Russia Reborn target?
Cyber Army of Russia Reborn targets Utilities, Energy, Food, Beverage & Tobacco, Government & Administration, Consumer Staples Distribution & Retail, Capital Goods, Commercial & Professional Services, Consumer Services, and 4 more in United States, Ukraine, Spain, Poland, Belarus, Canada, Denmark, France, and 2 more.
Where is Cyber Army of Russia Reborn from?
Mallory's sources associate Cyber Army of Russia Reborn with Russia.
Activity feed

Recent activity

20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

View more in app →
cyberveilleNews · Nov 15, 2026Sabotage cyber des systèmes de réfrigération européens : Iran et Russie en cause | CyberVeilleMentioned only as a historical comparison involving a 2024 attack against a meat facility in Los Angeles. The article does not establish involvement in the 2026 European refrigeration campaign.Read more ↗silobreaker blogNews · Nov 11, 2026Turning up the heat: Refrigeration sabotage and its geopolitical consequences - SilobreakerCited as historical precedent for Russia-linked interference with refrigeration. US authorities alleged that the group manipulated controls at a Los Angeles meat processor in 2024. Its connections with the two groups claiming the latest attacks do not establish responsibility for the 2026 campaigns.Read more ↗malware newsNews · Nov 9, 2026Critical Infrastructure Under Siege, From Freezers to Wider OT - Malware News - Malware Analysis, News and IndicatorsReferenced as a historical example of the same exposed-HMI attack method and as a source of members who formed Z-Pentest. CARR claimed HMI manipulation at US municipal utilities in 2024, including an incident causing a water-tank overflow in Muleshoe. The content does not link CARR directly to the refrigeration campaign.Read more ↗socradar blogNews · Nov 9, 2026Critical Infrastructure Under Siege, From Freezers to Wider OTA group connected to the wider actor ecosystem through members who helped form Z-Pentest. It claimed HMI manipulation at US municipal utilities in 2024, including a Muleshoe water-tank overflow and an intrusion affecting the Tipton water and electricity utility. These historical incidents illustrate the exposed-interface attack method; the article does not connect CARR directly to the refrigeration waves.Read more ↗
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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what's public. Mallory adds the parts that aren't: whether this actor's tooling has touched your footprint, the IOCs they're burning right now, and the detections to deploy next.
Target overlapMatch sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Tradecraft mapping20MITRE ATT&CK techniques reported for this actor, grouped by tactic.
Associated malwareFamilies linked to this actor, with IOCs and behavior.
Associated CVEsCVEs linked to this actor, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
ObservablesDomains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.