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Cyber Army of Russia Reborn (CARR) is a pro-Russian hacktivist group active since 2022 that has conducted disruptive cyber operations in support of Russia’s geopolitical objectives and the war against Ukraine. The group is also referred to as CARR and has at times been described as also known as Z-Pentest, while other reporting treats Z-Pentest as a closely linked associated group or offshoot. High-confidence reporting and government actions have linked CARR to Russian military intelligence, including the GRU; multiple assessments state it was founded, funded, directed, or otherwise supported by the GRU, and some reporting links its operations to Sandworm and GRU Unit 74455 support for its DDoS tooling. CARR is best known for distributed denial-of-service attacks and other disruptive operations against countries and organizations supporting Ukraine. Reported targets include government agencies, public services, financial institutions, media outlets, and critical infrastructure in the United States, Europe, Ukraine, and other countries. The group has claimed responsibility for hundreds of attacks worldwide. Beyond DDoS activity, CARR has been tied to intrusions affecting operational technology and industrial control environments, including water, wastewater, hydroelectric, food-processing, and energy-related facilities. Public reporting and legal actions have associated the group with attacks involving exposed HMIs, VNC-accessible systems, and SCADA environments, including incidents that created real public-safety risk. The group uses Telegram heavily for coordination, propaganda, recruitment, and public claims of responsibility, often publishing proof-of-impact material. Reporting indicates that CARR has relied on cybercrime-enabling services such as DDoS-for-hire capabilities and has coordinated with other pro-Russian hacktivist ecosystems, including NoName057(16). Named members or associates publicly tied to CARR include Yuliya Pankratova, Denis Degtyarenko, and Victoria Dubranova. Overall, CARR represents a state-linked disruptive threat actor that blends hacktivist branding with attacks on critical infrastructure, especially in sectors aligned with public services and industrial operations.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
20 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Pro-Russian hacker collective accused of launching DDoS attacks on government resources worldwide in support of Russia’s war effort against Ukraine.
Hacktivist organization linked by the EU to Russian military intelligence and suspected of denial-of-service attacks against Ukraine and supporters of Kyiv.
Pro-Russia hacktivist group conducting cyber-attacks against critical infrastructure in EU member states and Ukraine.
Hacktivist pro-russe lié à de multiples attaques contre des infrastructures critiques aux États-Unis et en Europe, notamment des installations de traitement d’eau et alimentaires, ainsi qu’à des attaques contre des systèmes SCADA d’une entreprise énergétique américaine.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.