Lynx Ransomware is a financially motivated ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operation active since mid-2024. Also known as LynxBlog and lynx_ransomware, it operates an affiliate model and uses double extortion: affiliates exfiltrate victim data, encrypt systems, and threaten publication through Lynx-operated leak and negotiation infrastructure. Lynx has targeted organizations in financial services, manufacturing, architecture and construction, energy, health care, information technology, and food and agriculture. Publicly reported victims include organizations in the United States, United Kingdom, and Germany. The Lynx encryptor uses AES-based multithreaded encryption and can locate and mount hidden volumes for encryption. It performs host and file-system discovery, including enumeration of files, system information, network shares, and processes. The malware inhibits recovery by deleting Volume Shadow Copy data through Windows APIs, changes the desktop wallpaper to display a ransom message, and can print ransom notes through locally available printers. Lynx maintains dedicated leak-site and authenticated victim-negotiation portals as part of its extortion workflow. Lynx has been assessed as closely related to the INC Ransom ecosystem based on codebase and operational overlap, although the precise organizational relationship is not conclusively established.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
38 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
38 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Named as a threat group associated with the separate FortiBleed activity, not as an operator of the JADEPUFFER campaign.
Ransomware variant with substantial code similarity to INC and assessed as a likely successor or closely related offshoot.
Conducted the FortiBleed ransomware campaign jointly with INC; mentioned only as a comparison to the separate PivotC2 activity.
Conducting a ransomware attack against Cutler Capital Management, a U.S. investment advisory firm in the financial-services sector.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.