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1 malware familyExploits CVEs in the wild

CL-STA-0048

Also known ascl_sta_0048

CL-STA-0048 is a Chinese state-backed / China-nexus APT cluster tracked by Unit 42 and linked in reporting to Chinese cyber-espionage activity. Content states it has been associated with exploitation of SAP NetWeaver Visual Composer vulnerability CVE-2025-31324 and was previously seen exploiting an Ivanti CSA zero-day. EclecticIQ linked CL-STA-0048 to the SAP activity based on tradecraft overlaps and reported overlap with post-exploitation tactics such as using ping for DNS beaconing and shared infrastructure. Reporting also notes broader industry assessments that UNC5221, UNC5174, and CL-STA-0048 are connected to China’s Ministry of State Security or affiliated private entities. In the SAP NetWeaver intrusions, CL-STA-0048 was one of several Chinese APTs targeting unpatched internet-facing systems. The group was observed issuing thousands of malicious commands to compromised NetWeaver instances for network-level discovery and SAP-specific application mapping, likely to prepare for lateral movement. EclecticIQ reported C2 traffic from compromised systems to 43.247.135[.]53, which resolved to the CL-STA-0048-linked domain sentinelones[.]com over TCP 10443, and observed reverse shell attempts to that host. The activity also included DNS-based beaconing using ping to an oastify.com subdomain shortly after reverse shell execution. The intrusions involved webshell-based post-exploitation and reconnaissance on highly connected SAP environments, including systems connected to internal ICS-adjacent networks. Victimology described in the content includes critical infrastructure and government-related entities in the UK, US, and Saudi Arabia, including natural gas distribution, water and waste utilities, medical device manufacturing, upstream oil and gas, and Saudi government ministries tied to investment and financial regulation. CL-STA-0048 is repeatedly mentioned alongside UNC5221 and UNC5174 as part of the Chinese APT activity exploiting SAP NetWeaver.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

13 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.

6 of 15 tactics21 techniques×N= number of intelligence reports citing this technique
MITRE ATT&CK
TA0042
Resource Development
2 techniques
T1583
Acquire Infrastructure
T1583.001
Domains
T1583.004
Server
T1608
Stage Capabilities
T1608.001
Upload Malware
TA0001
Initial Access
2 techniques
T1190
Exploit Public-Facing Application
T1566
Phishing
T1566.002
Spearphishing Link
TA0002
Execution
2 techniques
T1204
User Execution
T1204.002
Malicious File
T1574
Hijack Execution Flow
T1574.001
DLL
TA0005
Stealth
4 techniques
T1027
Obfuscated Files or Information
T1036
Masquerading
T1036.005
Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
T1218
System Binary Proxy Execution
T1574
Hijack Execution Flow
T1574.001
DLL
TA0009
Collection
1 technique
T1560
Archive Collected Data
TA0011
Command and Control
2 techniques
T1071
Application Layer Protocol
T1571
Non-Standard Port
ARSENAL

Associated malware families

1 malware family attributed to this actor across reporting.

IOCS

Observables

11 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.

IOC values are gated. View more in Mallory for domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.

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Target overlap

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Tradecraft mapping13

Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.

Malware arsenal1

Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.

Exploited CVEs1

CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Observables11

Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.