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Mallory
Threat actorLinked to in-the-wild CVEs

CL-STA-0048

Updated 7 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days1 mention · peak 1 in a dayToday
CVEs1Associated
Malware8Families
ATT&CK38Techniques
IOCs40Tracked
Origin
🇨🇳 China
Motivation
Espionage
Targets
INPKBDLKUSGBSA
Capabilities
Initial accessReconnaissancePost exploitationPersistencePrivilege escalationCredential theftDefense evasionDLL sideloadingProcess injectionExfiltration
Also known ascl_sta_0048

CL-STA-0048 is a China-linked cyberespionage activity cluster tracked by Palo Alto Networks Unit 42. Active since at least May 2024, it targets high-value organizations in South Asia, particularly telecommunications organizations and government agencies. Its objectives include collecting government employees’ personal information and stealing sensitive organizational and customer data. The cluster exploits public-facing services, including Microsoft IIS, Apache Tomcat, and Microsoft SQL Server, to establish access. It has also been linked to exploitation of SAP NetWeaver Visual Composer vulnerability CVE-2025-31324, followed by extensive network discovery and SAP application mapping. Its tooling includes PlugX, Cobalt Strike, Winos4.0-based malware, SoftEther VPN, Stowaway, and iox. It uses DLL sideloading and process injection to execute implants, Potato Suite tools for privilege escalation, and SspiUacBypass to attempt to bypass User Account Control. Credential-access activity includes attempted LSASS dumping through Cobalt Strike. CL-STA-0048 combines legitimate administrative utilities with encoded payload delivery to evade detection. Its Hex Staging technique incrementally assembles hexadecimal-encoded payloads before decoding them with certutil. It establishes persistence through SQL account creation and uses VPN and proxy tools to tunnel traffic through compromised systems. Collection activity includes database enumeration, searches for telephone-related fields, and staging of personal and sensitive client information. The cluster exfiltrates data through command-and-control channels and DNS queries, encoding stolen information into subdomains and triggering lookups with ping.

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Operational profile

Targeting

Who, where, and from where this actor operates. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Government & Administration
  • Telecommunication Services

Where they target

Geographies tied to known operations.

  • India
  • Pakistan
  • Bangladesh
  • Sri Lanka
  • United States
  • United Kingdom
  • Saudi Arabia

Where they're from

Attributed origin per open-source reporting.

  • China
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

38 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt.

12 of 15 tactics51 techniques
= intelligence reports citing the technique
TA0042Resource Development2 techniques
T1583Acquire Infrastructure
T1583.001Domains
T1583.004Server
T1608Stage Capabilities
T1608.001Upload Malware
TA0001Initial Access2 techniques
T1190×3Exploit Public-Facing Application
T1566Phishing
T1566.002Spearphishing Link
TA0002Execution3 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.001×2PowerShell
T1059.003Windows Command Shell
T1059.007JavaScript
T1204User Execution
T1204.002Malicious File
T1574Hijack Execution Flow
T1574.001DLL
TA0003Persistence3 techniques
T1112Modify Registry
T1136Create Account
T1136.001Local Account
T1505Server Software Component
T1505.003×2Web Shell
TA0004Privilege Escalation3 techniques
T1055×2Process Injection
T1068Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
T1548Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
T1548.002Bypass User Account Control
TA0005Stealth7 techniques
T1027×3Obfuscated Files or Information
T1036Masquerading
T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
T1055×2Process Injection
T1070Indicator Removal
T1070.004File Deletion
T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
T1218System Binary Proxy Execution
T1574Hijack Execution Flow
T1574.001DLL
TA0112Defense Impairment1 technique
T1112Modify Registry
TA0006Credential Access1 technique
T1003OS Credential Dumping
TA0007Discovery3 techniques
T1057Process Discovery
T1082System Information Discovery
T1083×2File and Directory Discovery
TA0009Collection2 techniques
T1213Data from Information Repositories
T1560×2Archive Collected Data
TA0011Command and Control5 techniques
T1071Application Layer Protocol
T1071.004×2DNS
T1090Proxy
T1105Ingress Tool Transfer
T1571Non-Standard Port
T1572Protocol Tunneling
TA0010Exfiltration3 techniques
T1030Data Transfer Size Limits
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
Vulnerabilities

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has associated with this actor across public reporting. 1 of them is exploited in the wild (not necessarily by this actor).

CVE-2025-313245 evidence · Nov 11, 2026Exploited in the wildUnauthenticated File Upload and RCE in SAP NetWeaver Visual ComposerApril 24, 2025: SAP released an emergency update for CVE-2025-31324, an unauthenticated arbitrary file upload in the Visual Composer development server. Canada's Cyber Centre reported awareness of exploitation dating to March 2025.View vulnerability →
Indicators of compromise

Observables

40 indicators attributed to this actor. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
FAQ

Frequently asked questions

Who does CL-STA-0048 target?
CL-STA-0048 targets Government & Administration and Telecommunication Services in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, United States, United Kingdom, and Saudi Arabia.
What malware does CL-STA-0048 use?
CL-STA-0048 is associated with Cobalt Strike, PlugX, BadPotato, IOX, Potato suite, and 3 more.
Where is CL-STA-0048 from?
Mallory's sources associate CL-STA-0048 with China.
Activity feed

Recent activity

16 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Are they targeting you?See whether this actor's campaigns touch your sector, your geography, or the products you run, and get alerted when that changes.
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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what's public. Mallory adds the parts that aren't: whether this actor's tooling has touched your footprint, the IOCs they're burning right now, and the detections to deploy next.
Target overlapMatch sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Tradecraft mapping38MITRE ATT&CK techniques reported for this actor, grouped by tactic.
Associated malware8Families linked to this actor, with IOCs and behavior.
Associated CVEs1CVEs linked to this actor, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Observables40Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.