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Mallory
Threat actor

Guccifer 2.0

Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
CVEs0Associated
Malware0Families
ATT&CK26Techniques
IOCs2Tracked
Origin
🇷🇺 Russia
Motivation
Influence operations
Targets
US
Capabilities
Credential theftExfiltrationDefense evasionSpoofingInitial accessLateral movementPost exploitation
Also known asguccifer_20Guccifer2.0

Guccifer 2.0 was an online persona used during the 2016 U.S. presidential election to claim responsibility for intrusions into Democratic Party organizations and to disseminate stolen political documents. The persona presented itself as a lone Romanian hacker, but U.S. government indictments and broad security-industry analysis have attributed the activity to Russian military intelligence officers of the GRU as part of a deception and influence operation. Guccifer 2.0 was used to obscure Russian responsibility for the compromises, promote and selectively leak stolen material, and channel data to amplifiers including WikiLeaks. The persona emerged immediately after public reporting on the Democratic National Committee compromise and claimed responsibility for hacking the DNC, later also releasing material associated with the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee and making additional claims about other Democratic-linked targets. Multiple analyses cited strong links between the underlying intrusions and Russian state-sponsored operators commonly tracked as Fancy Bear and Cozy Bear, while Guccifer 2.0 itself functioned as a cover identity intended to undercut attribution and shape public perception. Operationally, Guccifer 2.0 is associated with theft and publication of politically sensitive documents, exposure of personal information, and direct engagement with media figures and political intermediaries. The persona publicly released stolen files, claimed to have provided email troves to WikiLeaks, and was referenced in reporting and indictments concerning Russian efforts to use online personas and third parties to spread hacked material during the election. The activity combined cyber intrusion support, information operations, deception, and exfiltration rather than ransomware or financially motivated crime. Known aliases include guccifer20 and guccifer_20. High-confidence reporting ties the persona to Russian active measures targeting U.S. political organizations, especially Democratic institutions, in support of broader election interference objectives.

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Operational profile

Targeting

Who, where, and from where this actor operates. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Government & Administration

Where they target

Geographies tied to known operations.

  • United States

Where they're from

Attributed origin per open-source reporting.

  • Russia
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

26 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt.

12 of 15 tactics30 techniques
= intelligence reports citing the technique
TA0043Reconnaissance1 technique
T1589Gather Victim Identity Information
TA0042Resource Development4 techniques
T1583×2Acquire Infrastructure
T1583.001Domains
T1584×2Compromise Infrastructure
T1585×3Establish Accounts
T1586Compromise Accounts
T1586.001Social Media Accounts
TA0001Initial Access3 techniques
T1078×3Valid Accounts
T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application
T1566×5Phishing
TA0002Execution1 technique
T1059Command and Scripting Interpreter
TA0003Persistence1 technique
T1078×3Valid Accounts
TA0004Privilege Escalation1 technique
T1078×3Valid Accounts
TA0005Stealth3 techniques
T1036×4Masquerading
T1070Indicator Removal
T1078×3Valid Accounts
TA0006Credential Access1 technique
T1528Steal Application Access Token
TA0009Collection3 techniques
T1005Data from Local System
T1074Data Staged
T1213×4Data from Information Repositories
TA0011Command and Control1 technique
T1071Application Layer Protocol
TA0010Exfiltration5 techniques
T1030Data Transfer Size Limits
T1041×6Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
T1048×2Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
T1537×4Transfer Data to Cloud Account
T1567×6Exfiltration Over Web Service
T1567.001Exfiltration to Code Repository
T1567.002×2Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
T1567.003Exfiltration to Text Storage Sites
TA0040Impact1 technique
T1565Data Manipulation
Indicators of compromise

Observables

2 indicators attributed to this actor. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
FAQ

Frequently asked questions

Who does Guccifer 2.0 target?
Guccifer 2.0 targets Government & Administration in United States.
Where is Guccifer 2.0 from?
Mallory's sources associate Guccifer 2.0 with Russia.
Activity feed

Recent activity

20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what's public. Mallory adds the parts that aren't: whether this actor's tooling has touched your footprint, the IOCs they're burning right now, and the detections to deploy next.
Target overlapMatch sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Tradecraft mapping26MITRE ATT&CK techniques reported for this actor, grouped by tactic.
Associated malwareFamilies linked to this actor, with IOCs and behavior.
Associated CVEsCVEs linked to this actor, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Observables2Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.