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3 malware families

Nitrogen

Also known asnitrogen

Nitrogen is a ransomware group active since 2023. The content states it began as a malware loader used to deliver BlackCat/ALPHV ransomware and evolved into an independent ransomware operator by mid-2024. Its ransomware is described as derived from leaked Conti 2 builder code, with suspected links to the ALPHV/BlackCat ecosystem, and the group conducts double-extortion attacks. The content links Nitrogen primarily to Eastern European infrastructure and separately reports that it is linked to Russian nationals, including reporting that it is believed to be run by a Russian national. The group has targeted organizations in manufacturing, construction, and technology, with victim-sector data in the content also listing manufacturing, business services, technology, consumer services, and hospitality/tourism. Country distribution in the content is led by the United States, followed by Canada, with additional victims in Portugal, Taiwan, and France. Named victims in the content include Foxconn, ENENSYS Technologies, PCCA, Coweta County School System, SRP Federal Credit Union, and Red Barrels. Nitrogen is described as prioritizing data theft and extortion pressure, including double-extortion and, in some reporting, extortion-focused operations where encryption is absent or secondary. Reported access and post-compromise techniques in the content include PowerShell, scheduled tasks, LSASS memory credential dumping, RDP, SMB/Windows Admin Shares, automated collection, automated exfiltration, and exfiltration over C2 channels. Additional reporting in the content says Nitrogen commonly gains entry through compromised VPNs, remote desktop access, or phishing targeting IT administrators, and that it impersonates real companies to purchase official licenses for EDR and other security products through lightly vetted resellers. The content repeatedly associates Nitrogen with attacks on Foxconn’s North American operations, where the group claimed to have stolen about 8 TB of data and more than 11 million files and posted the company on its leak site. The allegedly stolen material was described as including confidential instructions, project documentation, drawings, schematics, and related files tied to major technology companies including Apple, Intel, Google, Nvidia, Dell, and AMD. A notable characteristic directly mentioned in the content is that Nitrogen’s VMware ESXi ransomware contains a coding flaw that corrupts the encryption public key, making decryption impossible even for the attackers. Multiple reports cited in the content state that victims may be unable to recover encrypted data even after paying. The content also notes ransom note filenames READ_ME_.TXT and readme.txt, and references an ESXi-targeting variant affecting hypervisors. No additional aliases or sub-groups are directly supported in the provided content.

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OPERATIONAL PROFILE

Targeting

Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Capital Goods
  • Commercial & Professional Services
  • Software & Services
  • Consumer Services
  • Health Care Equipment & Services
  • Materials

Where they target

Geographies tied to known operations.

  • 🇺🇸 United States
  • 🇨🇦 Canada
  • 🇵🇹 Portugal
  • 🇹🇼 Taiwan
  • 🇫🇷 France
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

29 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.

12 of 15 tactics37 techniques×N= number of intelligence reports citing this technique
MITRE ATT&CK
TA0001
Initial Access
3 techniques
T1133×2
External Remote Services
T1189
Drive-by Compromise
T1566
Phishing
TA0002
Execution
3 techniques
T1053
Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.005
Scheduled Task
T1059
Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.001
PowerShell
T1204
User Execution
T1204.002
Malicious File
TA0003
Persistence
2 techniques
T1053
Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.005
Scheduled Task
T1133×2
External Remote Services
TA0004
Privilege Escalation
2 techniques
T1053
Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.005
Scheduled Task
T1068
Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
TA0005
Stealth
1 technique
T1027
Obfuscated Files or Information
TA0006
Credential Access
1 technique
T1003
OS Credential Dumping
T1003.001
LSASS Memory
TA0007
Discovery
3 techniques
T1007
System Service Discovery
T1057
Process Discovery
T1135
Network Share Discovery
TA0008
Lateral Movement
1 technique
T1021
Remote Services
T1021.001
Remote Desktop Protocol
T1021.002
SMB/Windows Admin Shares
TA0009
Collection
2 techniques
T1074×3
Data Staged
T1119
Automated Collection
TA0011
Command and Control
1 technique
T1071
Application Layer Protocol
T1071.001
Web Protocols
TA0010
Exfiltration
5 techniques
T1020
Automated Exfiltration
T1041×6
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
T1048×2
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
T1537×2
Transfer Data to Cloud Account
T1567
Exfiltration Over Web Service
T1567.003×2
Exfiltration to Text Storage Sites
TA0040
Impact
3 techniques
T1486×12
Data Encrypted for Impact
T1496
Resource Hijacking
T1657
Financial Theft
IOCS

Observables

6 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.

IOC values are gated. View more in Mallory for domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

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Target overlap

Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.

Tradecraft mapping29

Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.

Malware arsenal3

Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.

Exploited CVEs

CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Observables6

Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.