Cactus is a financially motivated ransomware and extortion group active since 2023. The group has conducted global intrusions, including attacks against Dutch organizations, and has targeted internet-exposed, unpatched Qlik Sense servers for initial access since at least November 2023. It has also affected organizations in the healthcare and food-and-agriculture sectors. Cactus operations have involved exploitation of public-facing applications, reconnaissance and enumeration, credential-based access, deployment of legitimate remote-management tools, creation of unauthorized accounts, scheduled-task persistence, lateral movement through SMB and WinRM, data staging and exfiltration, and removal of forensic artifacts. In a documented intrusion following an access handoff from the ToyMaker initial-access group, Cactus performed network and endpoint enumeration, archived and exfiltrated customer data, deployed remote-administration software and OpenSSH reverse-shell persistence, and prepared systems for ransomware deployment. The group has also used Safe Mode rebooting to impair security controls. Cactus has used social-engineering tradecraft involving email flooding, Microsoft Teams impersonation, and abuse of Microsoft Quick Assist. Related activity used DLL sideloading to deploy BackConnect malware, followed by lateral movement and compromise of ESXi infrastructure. Cactus is a double-extortion operation: it steals data and uses the threat of publication alongside ransomware deployment. It has operated a dedicated leak site and has identified itself in ransom communications as the Cactus Group. The group is also referred to as Cactus Group, Cactus ransomware group, and Cactus ransomware gang.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
47 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
1 malware family attributed to this actor across reporting.
3 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 3 of them exploited in the wild.
For those looking for in-depth coverage of these exploits, the Arctic Wolf blog provides detailed insights into the specific vulnerabilities being exploited, notably CVE-2023-41266, CVE-2023-41265 also known as ZeroQlik, and potentially CVE-2023-48365 also known as DoubleQlik.
For those looking for in-depth coverage of these exploits, the Arctic Wolf blog provides detailed insights into the specific vulnerabilities being exploited, notably CVE-2023-41266, CVE-2023-41265 also known as ZeroQlik, and potentially CVE-2023-48365 also known as DoubleQlik.
Our vulnerability assessment for DoubleQlik / CVE-2023-48365 operated on the following criteria... As of 17 April 2024... 3143 servers are still at risk of DoubleQlik, indicating that 60% of all Qlik Servers online remain vulnerable.
47 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Named as one of the groups that absorbed affiliates after the Black Basta collapse; later cited as an example of rebranded affiliate activity retaining the same tooling and behavior.
Ransomware team described as collaborating with Black Basta, including payments and operational coordination.
Named as one of the ransomware families used by former BlackBasta affiliates after BlackBasta’s shutdown.
初期侵入と偵察で複数のRMMツールを利用したランサムウェアアクターの例として挙げられている。
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.