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UNC5792 is a Russian cyber-espionage threat cluster publicly tracked as UNC5792 and also referred to as UAC-0195, with reporting noting partial overlap with CERT-UA’s UAC-0195. U.S. authorities associate UNC5792 with officers tied to Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB), including the FSB Border Guards. The group has been linked to phishing and social-engineering campaigns targeting commercial messaging applications, especially Signal and WhatsApp, and has also been described as targeting secure communications and defense-related assets connected to Ukraine and allied interests. Reported targeting includes current and former U.S. government officials, military leadership and personnel, allied personnel, diplomats and foreign affairs officials, journalists, political figures, officials in Ukraine, NGOs supporting Ukraine, policy analysts, security researchers, academic researchers in Russian affairs, and Armenian civil society and public-sector entities. Broader reporting also places UNC5792 among Russian clusters focusing on battlefield technology, secure communications, and direct attacks on Ukrainian and allied defense assets. The group’s tradecraft centers on social engineering rather than breaking application encryption. Reported techniques include impersonating Signal support, soliciting verification codes, account PINs, and increasingly Signal Backup Recovery Keys; abusing legitimate linked-device functionality; using malicious QR codes; and modifying legitimate-looking Signal group invite pages so that victims are redirected to attacker-controlled device-linking flows. Reporting states that theft of Backup Recovery Keys can allow restoration of encrypted backups and access to historical private and group messages, and that compromised accounts have been used for follow-on phishing against additional targets. Public reporting also states that UNC5792 has used malicious group invites that link victim Signal accounts to attacker-controlled devices. Known aliases and related designations directly mentioned in the content are UAC-0195 and, in one report, partial overlap with CERT-UA’s UAC-0195.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
17 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
2 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Conducting social-engineering and phishing campaigns to compromise Signal and WhatsApp accounts, including use of legitimate device-linking features and altered group invite pages to gain unauthorized access to sensitive communications.
Conducting large-scale phishing and social engineering campaigns to compromise Signal and WhatsApp accounts of U.S. government officials, military leaders, allied personnel, journalists, NGOs, and others of intelligence interest.
Russian-linked phishing activity targeting Signal and WhatsApp accounts of officials, military personnel, journalists, and political figures through social engineering, device-linking abuse, and theft of Signal Backup Recovery Keys.
Conducting phishing and social engineering campaigns against commercial messaging applications to hijack accounts, access sensitive communications, and obtain historical conversations via Backup Recovery Keys.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.