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Mallory
Threat actor

pay2key

Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
CVEs0Associated
Malware0Families
ATT&CK39Techniques
IOCs15Tracked
Origin
🇮🇷 Iran
Motivation
Espionage
Targets
ILUSAZAE
Ransomware tactics
EncryptionData theft extortionLeak siteRaas operator
Capabilities
Credential theftExfiltrationPersistenceInitial accessLateral movementPost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissanceBrute force
Also known aspay2key

Pay2Key is an Iran-linked ransomware operation first observed in 2020 and widely associated with Iranian state interests. Multiple assessments have linked the operation to the Iranian threat actor Fox Kitten, also known as UNC757, and described Pay2Key as part of a broader pattern in which Tehran-aligned operators blend espionage, disruption, and criminal-style ransomware tradecraft. The group initially became known for ransomware and leak operations against Israeli organizations, including hack-and-leak and supply-chain activity, and later re-emerged as a ransomware-as-a-service operation recruiting affiliates on criminal forums while explicitly incentivizing attacks aligned with Iranian geopolitical objectives, particularly against Israel and the United States. Pay2Key has targeted organizations in Israel and the United States, with reporting also indicating targeting of organizations in Azerbaijan and the United Arab Emirates. Observed victim sectors include government-related entities, healthcare, industrial and logistics companies, insurance, and technology organizations. The operation has been characterized as pursuing strategic disruption and information theft in addition to ransom revenue, and some incidents have appeared more destructive than financially motivated. Historically, Pay2Key operations involved exploitation of internet-facing systems and remote access infrastructure, including known vulnerabilities in VPN and edge appliances, as well as RDP exposure and brute-force activity. Reported post-compromise behavior includes establishing persistence and reverse-proxy access, use of legitimate remote administration software for interactive access, credential theft with tools such as Mimikatz and LaZagne, Active Directory interaction, network discovery, lateral movement, backup-system enumeration, defense evasion, anti-forensics, and log clearing. The group has used stolen-data leak sites to pressure victims and has also been linked to supply-chain compromise activity. Recent reporting describes enhanced evasion, execution, and anti-forensics capabilities, including disabling endpoint protections, inhibiting recovery, and rapidly encrypting enterprise environments. Pay2Key has also expanded beyond Windows with a Linux variant targeting servers, virtualization hosts, and cloud workloads, using privileged execution, service and process termination, security-control disablement, persistence via scheduled reboot execution, and ChaCha20-based encryption. Separate technical analysis has described newer Pay2Key encryptors as derived from the Mimic and Conti ransomware lineage. Pay2Key is notable for sitting at the intersection of state-backed cyber operations and ransomware economics. Its evolution into a RaaS model, recruitment of affiliates from Russian-speaking criminal ecosystems, and preferential revenue-sharing for attacks against Iran’s adversaries reinforce assessments that the operation serves geopolitical as well as financial purposes.

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Operational profile

Targeting

Who, where, and from where this actor operates. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Health Care Equipment & Services
  • Software & Services
  • Financial Services
  • Government & Administration
  • Military
  • Transportation

Where they target

Geographies tied to known operations.

  • Israel
  • United States
  • India
  • Türkiye

Where they're from

Attributed origin per open-source reporting.

  • Iran
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

39 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt.

13 of 15 tactics52 techniques
= intelligence reports citing the technique
TA0001Initial Access3 techniques
T1078×6Valid Accounts
T1133External Remote Services
T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application
TA0002Execution5 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.003Cron
T1059Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.001PowerShell
T1106Native API
T1204User Execution
T1204.002Malicious File
T1569System Services
TA0003Persistence6 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.003Cron
T1078×6Valid Accounts
T1112Modify Registry
T1133External Remote Services
T1136Create Account
T1505Server Software Component
T1505.003Web Shell
TA0004Privilege Escalation3 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.003Cron
T1055Process Injection
T1078×6Valid Accounts
TA0005Stealth4 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or Information
T1055Process Injection
T1070Indicator Removal
T1070.004×3File Deletion
T1078×6Valid Accounts
TA0112Defense Impairment2 techniques
T1112Modify Registry
T1685×5Disable or Modify Tools
T1685.005×2Clear Windows Event Logs
TA0006Credential Access2 techniques
T1003×2OS Credential Dumping
T1110Brute Force
TA0007Discovery6 techniques
T1007System Service Discovery
T1018Remote System Discovery
T1046Network Service Discovery
T1057Process Discovery
T1082System Information Discovery
T1083×2File and Directory Discovery
TA0008Lateral Movement1 technique
T1021Remote Services
TA0009Collection2 techniques
T1213Data from Information Repositories
T1560×2Archive Collected Data
TA0011Command and Control3 techniques
T1090Proxy
T1090.003Multi-hop Proxy
T1102Web Service
T1219×2Remote Access Tools
TA0010Exfiltration1 technique
T1567Exfiltration Over Web Service
TA0040Impact5 techniques
T1485Data Destruction
T1486×12Data Encrypted for Impact
T1489Service Stop
T1490Inhibit System Recovery
T1657Financial Theft
Indicators of compromise

Observables

15 indicators attributed to this actor. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
FAQ

Frequently asked questions

Who does pay2key target?
pay2key targets Health Care Equipment & Services, Software & Services, Financial Services, Government & Administration, Military, and Transportation in Israel, United States, India, and Türkiye.
Where is pay2key from?
Mallory's sources associate pay2key with Iran.
Activity feed

Recent activity

14 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what's public. Mallory adds the parts that aren't: whether this actor's tooling has touched your footprint, the IOCs they're burning right now, and the detections to deploy next.
Target overlapMatch sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Tradecraft mapping39MITRE ATT&CK techniques reported for this actor, grouped by tactic.
Associated malwareFamilies linked to this actor, with IOCs and behavior.
Associated CVEsCVEs linked to this actor, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Observables15Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.