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OilRig is an Iranian state-sponsored cyber-espionage threat actor commonly tracked as APT34, Helix Kitten, Hazel Sandstorm, Cobalt Gypsy, Crambus, Earth Simnavaz, Europium, Evasive Serpens, IRN2, ITG13, and TA452. Cobalt Gypsy and Cobalt Lyceum have been described as subsets of the broader APT34 cluster. The group has conducted espionage-oriented operations against organizations in the Middle East, Israel, and Western countries. OilRig has used spearphishing emails with malicious attachments, including lures delivered from compromised or spoofed accounts, to gain access. Observed post-compromise activity includes PowerShell execution, process discovery with Tasklist, downloading remote files, and scheduled-task persistence. In one documented infection chain, a malicious document macro launched a script interpreter that established command-and-control communications and created a recurring scheduled task to execute a malicious script. The group has used browser-credential dumping tools, including LaZagne and PICKPOCKET, and has employed CANDYKING for desktop screen capture. OilRig has also used packed .NET malware such as ISMInjector, which loads embedded managed components in memory through .NET assembly-loading functionality to reduce reliance on files and hinder signature-based detection. Menorah, attributed to APT34, supports host profiling, command execution with output collection, file and directory enumeration, file transfer, and encrypted command-and-control communications. A reported association between OilRig and the Cavern framework is low-confidence and based on tradecraft similarities rather than direct code or infrastructure overlap.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
49 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
58 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
53 additional families tracked in Mallory.
15 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 15 of them exploited in the wild.
Windows Kernel vulnerability (CVSS 7.0, high) described as a TOCTOU privilege-escalation issue. The content says some publications allege APT34 used it with STEALHOOK, but notes that attribution is unconfirmed by NVD/CISA; it is in CISA KEV and has no Exploit-DB entry.
Clearsky has detected new and advanced attack vector used by MuddyWater to target governmental entities and the telecommunication sector. Notably, the TTP includes decoy documents exploiting CVE-2017-0199 as the first stage of the attack... Attack Vector 2 – CVE-2017-0199 ... MuddyWater has not used this TTP previously.
Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit.
This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.
Microsoft SharePoint vulnerability (CVSS 9.8, critical) described as an unauthenticated RCE; the content says it is in CISA KEV, was used by APT34, and is associated with ransomware. The article explicitly states it is not connected to Screening Serpens.
10 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
706 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Mentioned only as contextual comparison. The article cites unverified reporting that APT34 may use DNS-tunneled C2 and scheduled-task persistence; it also notes that reported links to listed CVEs are not indicators of Screening Serpens activity.
Listed in the detection's APT annotations.
OilRig is listed in the detection's ATT&CK annotations for T1068, Exploitation for Privilege Escalation.
Listed in the analytic's ATT&CK annotations.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.