Sandworm is a Russian military-intelligence cyber threat actor associated with the GRU’s Main Center for Special Technologies, Military Unit 74455. It is also tracked as APT44, Electrum, TeleBots, Voodoo Bear, IRIDIUM, Seashell Blizzard, and BlackEnergy Group. Active since at least 2009, Sandworm is principally associated with disruptive and destructive operations, particularly against Ukrainian critical infrastructure. It conducted operations against Ukraine’s electricity grid in 2015 and 2016 and has been associated with the 2017 NotPetya destructive malware operation, which caused extensive international collateral damage. Sandworm has also targeted network-edge devices to construct and operate botnet infrastructure, including the Cyclops Blink botnet, regarded as a successor to VPNFilter. Compromise of such devices can provide the group initial access to victim networks and support follow-on malicious activity. The group’s operations demonstrate a focus on sabotage and disruption alongside GRU cyber objectives.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
59 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
32 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
27 additional families tracked in Mallory.
28 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 28 of them exploited in the wild.
CVE-2014-6352 • bypass the patch of CVE-2014-4114 used by Sandworm
As recently as November 2025, an email phishing wave targeting Ukraine was found to deliver the implant via RAR archives that exploit CVE-2025-8088, a WinRAR vulnerability that has been exploited by a number of Russian hacking groups such as Sandworm, Gamaredon, and RomCom.
Sandworm also has demonstrated an ability to get access to the latest exploits, he says, pointing to the group's use of the NSA-developed EternalBlue exploit during its NotPetya campaign.
Sandworm Team has exploited... Microsoft Word via crafted TIFF images (CVE-2013-3906).
To date, at least eight vulnerabilities... have been exploited by this subgroup: Microsoft Exchange (CVE-2021-34473)... We have observed web shells deployed following exploitation of vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange (CVE-2021-34473)...
23 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
167 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A GRU-associated military cyber group linked in the leaked university documents to Russia's formal recruitment and training pipeline and previously associated with destructive operations, including the 2017 NotPetya attack.
A linked cluster was documented contacting job candidates through job-site chat and delivering a VPN client capable of executing commands.
A GRU-linked cyber operator associated with Military Unit 74455. The content links it to destructive cyber activity against Ukraine and other targets, including the 2017 NotPetya attack, and identifies reported personnel-pipeline overlap with Bauman University's concealed Department No. 4.
GRU Military Unit 74455, known as Sandworm, is associated in the reporting with destructive cyber operations, including activity against Ukraine and the 2017 NotPetya attack. The article reports a Department No. 4 graduate's placement at the unit but cautions that this does not establish the individual's participation in a named operation.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.