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Volt Typhoon is a PRC state-sponsored cyber espionage actor assessed to conduct long-term, covert pre-positioning in critical infrastructure. It is also tracked as Bronze Silhouette, DEV-0391, Insidious Taurus, Storm-0391, UNC3236, Vanguard Panda, Volt Typhoon APT, G1017, and Voltzite. The actor has compromised U.S. critical-infrastructure organizations, including energy-sector entities, seeking access that could enable disruption of essential services during a crisis involving Taiwan. Volt Typhoon has targeted end-of-life network devices and used compromised router and IoT-device botnets and other relay infrastructure to conceal intrusion origins. U.S. law enforcement disrupted botnet infrastructure used by the group in 2023 and subsequently disrupted its KV Botnet in 2024. Reported targeting includes organizations in the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
56 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
34 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
29 additional families tracked in Mallory.
33 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 33 of them exploited in the wild.
Initial Access: Volt Typhoon is known to exploit both known and zero-day vulnerabilities; known targeted products include Fortinet, Ivanti Connect Secure (formerly Pulse Secure), NETGEAR, Citrix, and Cisco CISA makes specific reference to the known FortiGate 300D firewall vulnerability CVE-2022-42475
Fortinet disclosed in February that the Chinese Volt Typhoon hacking group exploited two FortiOS SSL VPN flaws (CVE-2022-42475 and CVE-2023-27997) to backdoor a Dutch Ministry of Defence military network using custom Coathanger remote access trojan (RAT) malware.
In another Secureworks IR engagement in September 2021, the activity was slightly briefer. This time the attackers exploited a public-facing application to obtain initial access. Secureworks surmised that it was likely to have been an exploitation of CVE-2021-40539 against a ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus server.
"Lumen Technologies reported Chinese APT Volt Typhoon exploiting Versa Director servers (CVE-2024-39717), enabling credential interception and malicious code injection." | Lumen Technologies reported Chinese APT Volt Typhoon exploiting Versa Director servers (CVE-2024-39717), enabling credential interception and malicious code injection.
CVE-2024-21762 (CVSS skóre 9,6) Kritická zraniteľnosť CVE-2024-21762 sa nachádza v komponente sslvpnd a umožňuje zapisovať mimo povolené hodnoty vyrovnávacej pamäte. Úspešné zneužitie umožňuje neautentifikovanému útočníkovi ľubovoľné vykonávanie kódu alebo príkazov prostredníctvom špeciálne vytvorených HTTP požiadaviek. Pre zraniteľnosť nie je vydaná dočasná mitigácia... Zraniteľnosť CVE-2024-21762 môže byť aktívne zneužívaná.
28 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
177 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Chinese government espionage activity cited as background for targeting end-of-life Cisco routers and network devices in the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia.
Separate Chinese operation mentioned solely to distinguish it from UNC3886.
Mentionné uniquement comme contexte historique d’une précédente opération américaine contre un botnet.
China-linked, state-backed cyber-espionage and pre-positioning activity targeting U.S. critical infrastructure, including the energy sector, to establish covert access potentially usable for service disruption during a Taiwan-related crisis.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.