XENOTIME, also known as TEMP.Veles, is a Russian state-linked industrial-control-system threat actor associated with the TRISIS, TRITON, or HatMan malware. The group is known for the 2017 compromise of a Saudi Arabian petrochemical facility, where its activity caused a plant shutdown and targeted Triconex safety-instrumented-system controllers. XENOTIME has compromised ICS vendors and manufacturers, creating potential supply-chain risk, and has expanded its targeting from the Middle East to oil and natural-gas organizations in Europe, the United States, and Australia. It conducted research and reconnaissance against liquefied-natural-gas entities in Europe and the United States, including Dutch LNG terminal infrastructure. The group has used PowerShell-based tooling and scripts, scheduled-task triggers, timestomping, deletion of tools and logs, and masquerading of malicious files as legitimate Windows-update or industrial-application artifacts. Its demonstrated interest in safety systems and industrial processes creates a material risk of disruptive or destructive operations against energy and industrial infrastructure.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
26 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
8 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
3 additional families tracked in Mallory.
10 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Listed as one of many threat actors associated with the detection's ATT&CK-style annotations for PowerShell and DNS TXT command-and-control behavior; no specific campaign or activity is described in this reference.
Listed as an associated threat actor in the detection annotation for a Linux usermod root UID set analytic; no specific campaign or activity is described in this reference.
Known for targeting safety instrumented systems in petrochemical environments, moving from IT into OT networks and modifying controller logic; also associated with firmware-level impact scenarios.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.