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Mallory
Threat actor

Liwaa Mohammad

Updated 4 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
CVEs0Associated
Malware1Family
ATT&CK1Technique
IOCs0Tracked
Origin
🇮🇶 Iraq
Motivation
Hacktivism
Targets
ILAEUS
Ransomware tactics
Double extortionLeak siteRaas operator
Capabilities
ExfiltrationInitial accessReconnaissanceDDOSExtortion
Also known asliwaa_mohammadLiwaamohammad

Liwaa Mohammad is a pro-Palestinian, pro-Iran-aligned hacktivist group operating within the broader Cyber Islamic Resistance umbrella and associated with the Islamic Cyber Resistance / Cyber Isnaad Front ecosystem. Reporting places the group within an Iraq-linked cluster of militia-aligned cyber actors that includes the 313 Team, Fatimion Cyber Team, FAD Team, AL Toufan, AL_Safwa313, Al Safwa, Unit 313, and Gaza313, with apparent coordination from Iraqi territory. The group has been linked to Karim Fayad, also known as ZeroDayX and ZeroDayX1. Liwaa Mohammad has been associated with leak and doxxing activity, including distribution of purported intelligence and military-related datasets, although the authenticity of some claimed leaks has not been verified and therefore should be treated cautiously. The group is also tied to ransomware activity through Baqiyat 313 Locker, also known as BQTlock or Baqiyatlock313, an ideologically framed ransomware operation blending political messaging with double-extortion. BQTlock has been described as a Ransomware-as-a-Service offering promoted to hacktivists aligned against Israeli targets, and Liwaa Mohammad has been identified as one of the actors behind its development and promotion. Operationally, the group fits the broader conflict-driven Middle Eastern hacktivist model centered on propaganda, retaliation narratives, data theft, public leaks, and coercive disruption. Its observed behavior supports capabilities in initial access, exfiltration, extortion, reconnaissance, and DDoS-aligned coalition activity through its ecosystem relationships. Liwaa Mohammad’s activity is best understood as part of a deniable proxy-style cyber environment in which ideologically motivated hacktivist branding overlaps with militia-linked and pro-Iranian influence structures.

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Operational profile

Targeting

Who, where, and from where this actor operates. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Military

Where they target

Geographies tied to known operations.

  • Israel

Where they're from

Attributed origin per open-source reporting.

  • Iraq
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

1 distinct technique observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt.

1 of 15 tactics1 techniques
= intelligence reports citing the technique
TA0010Exfiltration1 technique
T1537Transfer Data to Cloud Account
Malware

Associated malware families

1 malware family Mallory has associated with this actor across public reporting.

FAQ

Frequently asked questions

Who does Liwaa Mohammad target?
Liwaa Mohammad targets Military in Israel.
What malware does Liwaa Mohammad use?
Liwaa Mohammad is associated with Baqiyat 313 Locker.
Where is Liwaa Mohammad from?
Mallory's sources associate Liwaa Mohammad with Iraq.
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what's public. Mallory adds the parts that aren't: whether this actor's tooling has touched your footprint, the IOCs they're burning right now, and the detections to deploy next.
Target overlapMatch sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Tradecraft mapping1MITRE ATT&CK techniques reported for this actor, grouped by tactic.
Associated malware1Families linked to this actor, with IOCs and behavior.
Associated CVEsCVEs linked to this actor, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
ObservablesDomains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.