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Daggerfly is a China-linked cyberespionage group active since at least 2014. It is also known as Evasive Panda, Bronze Highland, and StormBamboo. The group has targeted individuals, government agencies, non-governmental organizations, and telecommunications organizations across Asia and Africa, with operations focused on intelligence collection. Daggerfly has used the modular MgBot (POCOSTICK) framework, PlugX loaders, MACMA, and Linux backdoors. Daggerfly has conducted adversary-in-the-middle operations by compromising an internet service provider and poisoning DNS responses to redirect insecure software-update requests to attacker-controlled infrastructure. This tradecraft enabled delivery of malware to Windows and macOS systems through update mechanisms lacking installer-signature validation. On macOS, the group deployed a malicious browser extension to collect browser data and session cookies, encrypting and exfiltrating the data through cloud storage. The group uses DLL side-loading, including legitimate software to load PlugX components, and has abused legitimate remote-access software. Its MgBot plugin ecosystem supports network and Active Directory reconnaissance, browser-data and email-credential theft, process-memory dumping, keylogging, audio capture, screen and clipboard capture, and password dumping. Daggerfly has also exploited PAN-OS management-interface vulnerabilities, including CVE-2024-0012, to deploy Linux backdoors that embed within system binaries and services.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
73 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
9 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
4 additional families tracked in Mallory.
3 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 3 of them exploited in the wild.
This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.
This detection focuses on identifying vulnerable versions 18.12.407 and 18.12.416 of the 3CX desktop app... these specific versions have known vulnerabilities... CVE CVE-2023-29059
CVE-2024-0012 enables attackers to bypass authentication on the PAN-OS management interface. When chained with CVE-2024-9474, it permits unauthenticated remote code execution and administrator-level access.
70 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Listed in the detection annotation metadata.
Listed only as an annotation associated with the detection.
Daggerfly is listed in the detection's threat-actor annotations.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.