Loading threat actor…
Daggerfly is a China-aligned advanced persistent threat group active since at least 2014 and also tracked as Evasive Panda, Bronze Highland, and StormBamboo. The group is associated with long-running espionage operations and has targeted telecommunications organizations, including victims in Africa, with activity focused on intelligence collection. Daggerfly is known for combining modular malware frameworks and living-off-the-land tradecraft. Reported tooling includes MgBot and PlugX-related loaders, with campaigns using legitimate software to side-load malicious DLLs for execution. The group has also been linked to delivery of the Nightdoor backdoor and to supply-chain intrusion activity involving compromise of software update infrastructure. Observed execution and staging methods include DLL side-loading, PowerShell-based download-and-execute activity, and abuse of legitimate remote administration software. Its post-compromise behavior includes extensive reconnaissance and collection. Documented capabilities include network scanning, Active Directory enumeration, browser and mail credential theft, keylogging, audio capture, screen and clipboard capture, process memory dumping, and collection of local system information for tailored command-and-control behavior. Daggerfly has also dumped SAM, SYSTEM, and SECURITY hives from compromised Windows systems. For persistence, the group has used scheduled tasks. For command and control, it has used HTTP and DNS-based channels, including custom user-agent construction derived from victim operating system information. The overall pattern is consistent with a mature Chinese espionage actor focused on stealthy access, long-term persistence, and broad information theft.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
73 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
8 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
3 additional families tracked in Mallory.
2 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 2 of them exploited in the wild.
This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.
This detection focuses on identifying vulnerable versions 18.12.407 and 18.12.416 of the 3CX desktop app... these specific versions have known vulnerabilities... CVE CVE-2023-29059
30 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Listed as one of many threat actors associated with the detection's ATT&CK-style annotations for PowerShell and DNS TXT command-and-control behavior; no specific campaign or activity is described in this reference.
Listed as a threat actor associated with PowerShell execution behavior relevant to this detection.
Listed as a threat actor associated with the PowerShell P/Invoke process injection API chain detection and related ATT&CK techniques.
Listed as a threat actor associated with PowerShell execution behavior relevant to this detection analytic.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.