MuddyCoast
UNC3313, also referred to as MuddyCoast, is an Iran-nexus threat group. The provided content describes it as conducting surveillance and strategic information-gathering operations via spear-phishing campaigns, and as an Iranian group active against Israel and the Middle East. One cited report states UNC3313 is affiliated with MuddyWater. Reported activity includes distribution of the JELLYBEAN dropper and CANDYBOX backdoor using phishing lures and file-sharing services, and use of up to nine legitimate remote monitoring and management tools to evade detection and maintain access. Mandiant also attributed multiple backdoors to UNC3313, including STARWHALE, STARWHALE.GO, and GRAMDOOR. STARWHALE is a VBScript/WSF backdoor that establishes persistence by creating a Windows service, performs host enumeration, communicates with a hardcoded C2 over HTTP POST using custom encoding, and executes commands via cmd.exe. STARWHALE.GO is a Golang variant delivered via certutil and an NSIS installer, persists via a Run key, exchanges JSON over HTTP POST with a hardcoded C2, and executes received commands via cmd.exe or directly based on file extension. GRAMDOOR is a Python 3.9 / PyInstaller backdoor delivered via an NSIS installer, persists via a Windows Run key, only executes on Windows 8 and higher, and uses the Telegram Bot API for command-and-control. Additional observed tradecraft includes storing PowerShell downloader commands in Registry keys referenced by a scheduled task, and downloading and installing the legitimate eHorus remote access tool as a Windows service for remote access. Google also reported that Iranian hackers MuddyCoast (UNC3313) used Gemini for malware development and debugging, accidentally exposing C2 domains and keys. Known aliases in the provided content are MuddyCoast and UNC3313.
Know when an actor pivots toward your sector
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Targeting
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Where they're from
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
- IR
Tradecraft
29 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
Associated malware families
5 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
Recent activity
3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Used Gemini to support malware development and debugging; operational security mistakes reportedly exposed C2 domains and keys.
UNC3313 is an Iranian threat group conducting surveillance and information-gathering via spear-phishing, using droppers, backdoors, and legitimate RMM tools.
The version that knows your environment.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.